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ABSTRACT
Effective management of transnational joint ventures requires understanding of two major
trends rooted in our globalizing information economy.  Businesses are becoming ever more know-
ledge-centered; and they find themselves thrust into ever more transcultural environments.  The
MABE-GE joint venture is a best-practice case that offers important insights for coping success-
fully with both of these trends.  Over the past twelve years an alliance with GE has transformed
MABE from a dynamic but traditional Mexican firm with its share of traditional problems, into an
autonomous transnational powerhouse expanding rapidly into South America.  This has been
made possible by the synergy between MABE's markedly transcultural orientation from its found-
ing on, and GE's exemplary mentoring practices that transmitted GE's advanced corporate ulture
without undermining MABE's autonomy or national and corporate identity.  GE's own rapid culture
change, its minority (48%) holding in the joint venture, and its fortunate choice of the manager in
charge of relations with MABE were key factors in this outcome.  The study offers insights into the
bridging of gaps between national, corporate, and functional/professional cultures, the choice of
joint-venture partners, culture transfer, human resou ce development, and management training.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
International joint ventures are notoriously unpredictable.  At times they stumble despite
strenuous management efforts; at other times they succeed against great odds.  In our globalizing
information economy, it is crucial to arrive at a better understanding and better management con-
trol of such ventures - and of transnational projects in general in which cultural barriers invariably
play a major role.
The present study address the above issue.  It analyzes the best-practice case of a joint
venture between General Electric and a leading Mexican major-appliance producer marketing
under the MABE label.  Over the past twelve years the dynamics of this joint venture, with crucial
input from GE, have completely transformed MABE.  From a reasonbly well-run but traditional
Mexican firm with its share of tradiional problems, Mabe has grown into a transnational power-
house, an organization that is confidently weathering Mexico's current economic storm while
expanding in an aggressive and autonomous manner into South America.  This is all the more
interesting because the transformation has been achieved not in a fast-developing East Asian
economy but rather against the backdrop of poor national economic management that has led
Mexico into its current development crisis.
The insights of the study emerged from following the course of MABE's development that
spanned two generations from its founding to the present, with particular attention to the transfor-
mation that had begun prior to the joint venture with GE and thereafter gathered momentum with
astonishing rapidity. MABE's course was marked by seven major decision points or "moments of
truth," all but one of which involved the joint venture.  These were:  (i) the dilemma of exit from the
industry or fast growth through interna ional alliances;  (ii) commitment to the joint venture with
GE;  (iii) establishment of a close linkage between strategic coordination and human resource
development;  (iv) creation of a state-of-the-art plant for export to GE's markets in the U.S.;  (v)
integration of Mexican acquisitions into a unified corporate culture;  (vi) transnational expansion
into South America;  and (vii) holding course through Mexico's current national crisis.
The experience of MABE and GE is out of the ordinary in ways that make it a best-practice
case and thus carry direct implications for the success of international alliances and transnational
operations in general.  The ability of organizations to relate productively a ross cultural differences
turns out to be critical in this regard.  A willingness to adress cultural differences with empathy
and on the basis of mutual respect allows firms to adapt their corporate practices, particularly
those centered on human-resource and core-competencyi development, in ways that support the
attainment of transational competitiveness.
In this study, the term  "transcultural" will be used to characterize business and other envi-
ronments that transcend the narrowness of a single culture and demand attitu es or orientations
that confer the ability to cultivate relationships and pursue objectives across cultural differences.
The term "cross-cultural," as usual, will refer simply to arrangements or functions that operate
across cultural differences, as in cross-cultural teams or cross-cultural issues.
 On the Mexican side, the MABE-GE joint venture is noteworthy for the openness
that had existed within MABE to cultural currents transcendi g a narrow national
perspective, even before the first conacts with General Electric.  This transcultural
orientation has played a major role in MABE's ability to work successfully with GE
because MABE, as the partner less advanced both in techology and manage-
ment when entering the venture, has had to undertake the lion's share of
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transcultural adaptation, learning, and transformation to make the joint effort
succeed.  It has done so in an exemplary fashion.
Founded in 1947 by Basque immigrant families in Mexico whose transcultural awareness
had been honed by many centuries of a separate Basque identity in Spain, MABE was being led
from the start by persons oriented toward maintaining ties with Europe and cultivating new ties
with the United States and South America.  It is no coincidence that MABE's Director General,
hired from outside the founding families in the Sixties, was bicultural, having spent a good part of
his growing years in the U.S.  The second generation of the founding families, that was soon to
enter top executive positions, grew up with meaningful ties - by birth, university studies, or exec-
utive apprenticeships - to the broader world outside Mexico.
By the time the GE joint venture materialized as a possibility, there was a great felt need
within MABE for an international partner corporation that would transfer to the firm high technical
and management skills and provide access to major external markets.
Above all, there was at the top a genuine commitment to learning across cultural barriers,
coupled with a lack of defensiveness that was made possible not only by the transcultural orienta-
tion of the individuals involved, but also by their strong sense of identity.  This identity encom-
passed MABE's corporate culture as well as Mexican national culture.  It communiated itself to all
levels within the firm and made possible the rapid absorption of technical know-how and interna-
tional management practices from GE.
 On the side of General Electric, several factors converged that enabled GE to
play a highly constructive mentoring role in MABE's transformation.  GE has been
able to transmit much of its advanced corporate culture to its partner while
supporting MABE's autonomy and identity.  GE's ability to sustain its high-quality
mentoring of this joint venture is no less exemplary than MABE's ability to absorb
it, and in the process to develop to the point of being able to offer worthwhile
reciprocal experince to GE.
The factors that promoted GE's success included the company's own corporate culture
change; GE's minority share in the equity of the venture that precluded heavy-handed policy
impositions; and GE's fortunate, not fully conscious choice of th  right kind of person  to interface
with MABE.  This last factor was crucial for success, because it infused GE's mentoring functions
with the appropriate transcultural orientation that is as important on the part of the mentoring firm
as it is on the part of the firm being mentored.
Culture change within GE.  Over the years since the joint-venture negotiations began in
1984, GE itself had been in the process of ongoing cultural transformation under its CEO, Jack
Welch.  The changes involved decentralization of authority by flattening the corporate pyramid;
the systematic opening of upward communications ("Work Outs"); broad diffusion of significant
advances ("Best Practices"); and a perspective encouraging free and productive interactio s even
beyond the organization's own limits ("Boundary-lessness").  This promoted good mentoring by
placing intrinsic value on the transmission of technical and management know-how and the
cultivation of initiative at all levels.
Equity shares.  The exercise of initiative on MABE's part was, moreover, powerfully back-
stopped by the 52% equity share and all-Mexican management that the joint-venture agreement
secured for the Mexican side.  This obligated GE to rely on persuasion rather than formal instruc-
tions if differences ever arose - a far more effective tool over the long run, given a strong incentive
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to succeed on both sides.  Persuasion requires effort to understa  the culture and point of view
of the partner; it also motivates the partner to reinforce his autonomy by doing things right the first
time.
GE's choice of manager to interface with MABE.  Finally, it was crucial that GE
assigned the function of interfacing with this particular joint venture to an executive who bo h by
his abilities and by GE's organizational dynamics turned out to be exceptionally suited to
facilitation of a mentoring relationship.  Transfer of know-how from GE to MABE required an
atmosphere of respect for MABE's distinct identity, else the benefits that GE counted on from
MABE's competence within the Mexican busines  environment would have been blunted and
promising initiatives stifled.  The task called for the mature ability to listen, to relate with empathy
across cultural differences, to establish genuine mutual respct, and to allow insights and
relationships to grow over a horizon of years.
Yet, these characteristics do not tend to be rewarded by rapid promotions in a large
corporation.  The hard-driving executive on the fast track, rather, typically exhibits energy,
assertiveness, and a desire for the frequent job reassignments that will advance his career.  There
is thus reason to believe that our globalizing business environment with its increasing emphasis
on transnational operations, is creating a latent contradiction between the more mature outlook
required for successful mentoring across cultural barriers, and the typical characteristics of the
fast-rising executive with his rather self-centered career drive.
Even though GE's own internal process of cultural transformation implies a higher
valuation of the abilities that are also required for successful mentoring, incentive systems are
slow to change.  In this context, a truly remarkable feature of the MABE-GE case is that the
manager whom GE had selected for interfacing with MABE did in fact possess the maturity and
abilities to rise to the challenge.  Moreover, as a result of GE's internal organizational dynamics,
he was left in place long enough to see through the mentoring process to the point where the one-
sided transfer of know-how from GE to MABE gave way to an organizational relationship of
progressively greater reciprocal exchange of experience.  Appreciation of the significance of this
history is one of the insights gained from the present study.
Other important points for consideration that emerged from the study concerned the
choice of joint-venture partners, the creation of flexible cross-cultural teams, learning across
cultural boundaries, facilitaion of multi-cultural change processes, and the development of stra-
tegic alliance networks.
Overall, the study indicates that many insights about transnational management problems
can be gained by adopting an analytic perspective that focuses on cultural differences and on how
they can be bridged.  The usefulness of this perspective in confronting management decisions
that arise in our globalizing, plyglot business economy is evident.  It would appear, moreover, that
adopting such a perspective will yield fresh insights in at least two other areas of current concern:
first, coordination of different corporate cultures when creating larger organizations expected to
function in a seamless manner; and second, integration of the work of professionals trained in
different disciplines when striving to create new or improved corporate core competencies.
Appreciation of the potential for generalization of the perspective that focuses on cultural
differences is thus a significant result of this study.
Finally, the study carries implications for the personal characteristics, attitudes, and skills
of managers who are likely to be successful in a transcultural business environment.  The study
suggests that a decisive advantage accrues to mature attitudes and skills as against the self-
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advancing dynamism and drive of the typical corporate executive on the fast track.  There appears
to be a convergence between the characteristics required for success in transcultural functioning
and the ones implicit in the most advanced practices advocated in the recent business literature.
Thus the study raises important issues for human resource development and management
training.
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INTRODUCTION
Why the MABE-GE Venture is of Interest
"My workers have to commute every day between the First World and the Third
World and have had to do so from the start."
These were the words in which Urbano Pérez, the leader of the Mexican side of a joint
U.S.-Mexican project team, summed up the challenge facing him when the work on a 100-million
dollar green-field plant got under way seven years ago in San Luis Potosi.  It was the crucial first
effort of a highly successful joint venture between General Electric and Exinmex (EXIN), a leading
Mexican major appliance producer marketing under the MABE label.
The name "MABE" had over the preceding decades become firmly established in Mexico
as representing the continuing identity of the firm over its entire history, even though the name
was formaly adopted as a legal designation only with the establi hment of the joint venture with
GE.  In this report, "MABE" is used to designate GE's partner enterprise both before and after the
joint venture.
The agreement establishing the MABE-GE joint venture in 1986 assigned to the expanded
MABE organization all of MABE's pre-existing major appliance related assets, together with a sub-
stantial capital infusion from GE for the immediate construction of a major plant to supply GE mar-
kets in the United States.  GE also committed itself to the ongoing transfer of technological and
management know-how to MABE.  The agreement gave GE a 48 percent equity in the expanded
MABE organization but left MABE under exclusively Mexican management that has conti ued
uninterrupted to the pres nt day.
From 1986 to 1993 EXIN played no autonomous role in the industry.  In the latter year,
however,  MABE laid the basis for some major acquisitions in South America that GE did not wish
to pursue.  These acquisitions were thus undertaken by MABE's Mexican investors alone, through
the EXIN legal entity, but with a pending option for GE to join the ventures through MABE.  In the
meantime, MABE's continuing involvement has taken the form of royalty and management-ser-
vices contracts with the respective enterpriss.
The experience of MABE and GE offers a Best-Practice case of how firms
involved in transnational joint ventures can help the ventures succeed.  An
appropriate transcultural orientation of venture partners is critical in this respect.
Such an orientation allows partners to adapt their corporate practices, particularly
those centered on human-resource and core-competency development, in ways
that suport the attainment of transational competitiveness.
In the MABE-GE alliance, the partner less advanced both in technology and management
when entering the venture, has had to undertake the lion's share of transcultural adaptation, learn-
ing, and transformation to make the joint effort succeed, and has done so in an exemplary fash-
ion.  Yet the role of GE in mentoring MABE's transformation has been no less exemplary, be-
cause GE has been able to transmit much of its advanced corporate culture to MABE without
undermining its partner's autonomy.  Good transcultural corporate mentoring has surprising
commonalities with good parenting.
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The result has been the metamorphosis of MABE, a reasonably well-run but traditional
firm centered on the Mexican domestic market, with its s are of traditional problems, into an en-
terprise that over just a dozen years has matured into a transnational powerhouse in its own right.
This enterprise is providing GE with more than just fast-expanding financial returns.  Given that
MABE is one of GE's highly successful internationl j int ventures, it also contributes world-class
transcultural capabilities to GE, first of all in those parts of Latin America where GE does not yet
have a leading major-appliance presence, and potentially in a broader international context as
well.
The MABE organization, as expanded by the joint venture with General Electric, now sup-
plies under the GE and Sears labels about one quarter of the market for gas ranges and three
percent of the market for refrigerators in the United States.  In Mexico, it serves half of the market
for major appliances including washing machines (Exhibit 2).  MABE production meets leading
U.S. and world quality, cost, and on-time delivery standards by following advanced strategic and
human resource management practices.  Since 1993 MABE has set its sights on a course of
expansion into South America whose sharing with GE is currently under negotiation.
MABE's experience touches on important issues that are at present at the center of
concern in transational human resource management.  How can a company develop a shared
vision and a global mindset?  How should entry into emerging markets be manged?  How can
flexible global teams be creat d?  How can global learning across boundaries be promoted?  How
should global networks and strategic alliances be developed?  How can multi-cultural change pro-
cesses be facilitated?
The case of MABE, as an example of a successful joint venture, is particularly informative
for a number of reasons:
 MABE is flourishing in the midst of the enormous current difficulties of the Mexican
economy, riding out the national crisis brilliantly.  Its overall sales have held up
remarkably well in the face of an almost thirty percent drop in domestic demand for
major appliances in Mexico - because export growth, primarily to U.S. markets
supplied by GE, has largely offset the domestic contraction (Exhibit 1).  MABE,
with strategic advice from GE, has also successfuly offset a doubling of foreign
subcontracting costs that resulted from the collapse of the peso, by switching to
domestic suppliers suddenly faced with huge excess capacities.
 Even before the present national crisis MABE had been exceptional, both in its
early abandonment of the traditional, highly authoritarian management style that
continues to be prevalent throughout Latin America, and in its progressive trans-
ition to a high level of management excell nce that by now incorporates core ele-
ments of GE's corporate culture.
 MABE is being characterized by General Electric as the best of its joint ventures
worldwide in major appliances and among its top joint ventures in all its lines of
business.  This recognition rests on MABE's accomplishments in working with GE
to bridge the Anglo-Latin cultural gap, as well as on MABE's success in unifying
the diverse corporate cultures of its extensive acquisitions within Mexico.  The
result has been a corporate vision shared by all MABE units that includes a trans-
national and transcultural mindset.
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 Since 1993, MABE's top management has been on a course of aggressive trans-
national penetration into South America.  Initial acquisitions in Venezuela, Colom-
bia, and Ecuador have been channeled through EXIN without MABE equity par-
ticipation, because GE has not given its support to these ventur s as originally
contemplated by and for MABE.  None the less, MABE's involvement through roy-
alty arangements and management contracts is at the core of these initiatives,
with an option for GE to join the ventures by bringing them into MABE.  At the
same time, MABE has secured GE's tentaive agreement to a joint MABE-GE
penetration of South American major-appliance markets; final arrangements are
under negotiation as of March, 1996.
 MABE is now parlaying its transcultural experience, with the mentoring relationship
reversed, into the ongoing rapid South American expansion.  In the past, MABE
had contributed members to cross-cultural joint teams under General Electric
mentoring; now MABE is mentoring personnel of its South American partners as-
signed to similar joint teams as it assists in the management of the new ventures.
MABE had been absorbing know-how for decades across the U.S.-Mexico bound-
ary; it is now passing on that learni g from Mexico to South America.  MABE had
long cultivated U.S. ties that eventualy led to the joint venture with G.E.; it is now
in the process of developing a network of alliances spaning two continents.
Patently MABE as an organization has advanced to the point of being an au-
tonomous player on the transational scene.
The question arises: how has MABE been able to achieve these successes?  Where did it
derive its decisive advantage over so many other struggling Mexican and other transnational joint
ventures involving world-class partner enterpris s?  Was there a moment of truth in the
company's past that, faced successfully, has given MABE a charmed life ever since?
It turns out that MABE's history contains not one moment of truth but, like the career of a
great matador, a series of such moments over the years - each with the potential for a fatal mis-
calculation, each to be met with increasing paache and style for true greatness.  We shall look in
detail at seven moments of truth in MABE's history that represent seven particularly critical deci-
sion points.   At each of these points, the organization chose what in retrospect has proven to be a
favorable path.  It is hard to avoid wondering whether it might not have been just serendipity or
pure chance that had selected this one enterpris  for a privileged outcome among many that took
random turns at various points of the road.  Yet, when for MABE the outcome happens to have
been favorable at one turning point after another, it becomes compelling to seek systematic rea-
sons behind the consistently right choices.
Objective and Approach of the Study
The objective of the present study has been to identify MABE's sources of strength - with a
focus on the MABE-GE transcultural interaction and related human-resource development deci-
sions - in order to gain insights from MABE's history for the mangement of transnational joint
ventures in our rapidly globalizing information economy.
 MABE was founded by Basque immigrants to Mexico; an important transcultural orienta-
tion can be recognized from the start at various points throughout the company's history that has
given MABE a consistent advantage over the years.  On the side of GE, exceptionally enlightened
liaison with this joint venture has made a decisive ontribution to success.  The study suggests
that the answer to the question: what makes a transnational joint venture truly successful? - may
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well hinge on the extent to which the partners in the ventur  are capable of adopting not just a
transnational but a transcultural perspective.
The term "transcultural," defined in general terms in the Executive Summary, above, will
be given more precision in a business context further below, in the Conceptual Framework section
of this study, by identifying three specific cultural gaps that corporations need to bridge in order to
be successful in their transnational operations.  The gaps occur, first, between national cultures;
second, between corporate cultures; and third, between the strategic and human-resource
functions within particular organiz tions.  These cultural gaps, and ways of bridging them, will be
at the analytic core of the study.
Such a perspective, nevertheless, cannot stand on its own in providing joint ventures with
the orientation needed for success.  The trans-cultural perspective must rathe  inform a modern,
"knowledge-centered" management apprach whose outlines are now emerging from the interna-
tional management literature.  The competitiveness of cutting-edge business units to-day, from
small start-ups to leading transnational corporations, hinges ever more critically on their ability to
mobilize all the knowledge resources to which they have access, both on the side of technology,
information systems and communications, and on the side of organizational dynamics and human
resource development.  Key points of such an approach are also summarized in the Conceptual
Framework section below.
The main body of the study follows the gradual unfolding of MABE's transnational capabili-
ties over its consecutive moments of truth.  Analytic commentary focuses on transcultural func-
tioning in the framework of an integra d, knowledge-centered mangement approach.  The study
closes with tentative conclusions about concrete management issues that have to be resolved for
the sucessful functioning of transnational joint ventures.  The conclusions are presented from the
point of view of both the more and the less advanced joint venture partner, with emphasis on the
transcultural aspects of human resource development.
BACKGROUND
Origin of the Study
The idea for the study originated at the Executive Briefing of Cornell University's Center for
Advanced Human Resource Studies in Mexico City in September, 1994, where MABE's Human
Resources Director, Juan Diego Oliva Alvarado, gave a presentation on the advances in human
resource management achieved by his firm.  This presentation was noteworthy because it report-
ed the results of a transition from the traditional centralized management style to a style in
keeping with best international practice.  The latter involved free flow of information within the
organization, decentralization of decisionmaking and authority, advanced systems of man-
agement and worker education, and the involvement of personnel at all levels in the improvement
of productive processes and product quality.
The presentation was impressive because modern management practices are still rare in
Mexico.  The case of MABE provided an instructive contrast with the experience of the auth r at
one of the large Mexican para-state companies that attempted initiatng corporate culture change.
He was thus keenly aware of the difficulties in overcoming the traditional, highly centralized and
authoritarian management culture that is still widespread in both the para-state and private sec-
tors in Mexico.  So it is, to be sure, all over Latin America and other Third World regions, not to
speak of being far from extinct in the industrially advanced world as well.
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MABE's presentation dealt with w at has been was achieved, but did not encompass how
it was done.  This latter question has been at the focus of the present study.  The study addresses
the steps in the process of change which consist of identifying, confronting, and resolving a series
of strategic choice situaions over the years that such a transition usually requires.
It is important to analyze the roots of MABE's success for several reasons:
 The transition from a traditional to a modern management style is by no means
easy to achieve in Mexico.  Similar conditions prevail over much of Latin America,
indeed, over much of the developing world; thus MABE's case is of broad general
interest.
 MABE's success is particularly important because it is achieved against the back-
ground of the generally poor economic development experience of Latin America,
as contrasted with the experience of the East Asian economies, recently analyzed
by the World Bank.ii
The Current Economic and Business Situation in Mexico
Consumer markets and the crisis in economic development.  Before the peso
devaluation of December, 1994 that precipitated the current crisis, some 63% of workers in
Mexico earned no more than the minimum wage of $ 200 per month, and only 15% earned over
US$ 17,000.iii Thus, only the latter modest stratum could be considered as part of any reasonably
defined consumer market, i.e., fewer than 15 million people in all.
This narrow market is mainly urban and young; over half of the population of
Mexico is urban and three quarters are under 35 years of age.  The consumer market is heavy in
household durables including major appliances - an important datum from MABE's point of view -
and also in homebuilding products and building materials.
Economic development, as is now beginning to be more widely recognized, requires struc-
tural transformations that broaden the middle class and thereby support productivity growth.  Not
only will the expansion of consumer markets depend on such a trend, leading to important econo-
mies of scale in domestic industries, but the accumulation of much of national wealth will likewise
depend on this same trend, because middle-class families invariably finance the major part of hu-
man capital accumulation through the education of their children.  A recent World Bank studyiv has
established that in the industrially advanced Western economies, between seventy and niety
percent of national wealth other than land and resourc is embodied in human capital (the
remaining category being produced and manufactured wealth).  Moreover, th  higher the level of
development of a society, the larger is its per capita wealth in human capital; on the latter
measure, Mexico registers at a level that is 4.6 times lower than the U.S. and 8.5 times lower than
Japan.v
Events over the past decade, while Mexico marched under the banner of economic
reform, have not been favorable for broadening the middle class.  The reform involved an opening
of the economy to the international market during the past two presidential terms (de la Madrid,
1882-88; and Salinas, 1988-94) - an opening that has been unnecessarily abrupt.  It has been
undertaken without appropriately cushioning the shock of the transition from a heavily protected to
an open economy, by technical assistance and other short-term supportive measures.  Many
firms in Mexico's industrial core would have need d such help for undertaking the structural adap-
tations and modernization without which they could not compete in the newly opened market.
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The consequent flood of foreign imports critically weakened many domestic firms; it also created a
major balance-of-payments deficit that the government attempted to close by attracting foreign
capital through high interest rates.  The latter policy undermined the position of domestic industry
even more, because it put the capital needed for modernizaton out of the reach of many medium-
sized and smaller firms.  By 1993, over 100,000 jobs were lost in such firms alone;vi Mexico's
industrial core was severely eroded.
Such was the country's economic situation before the December, 1994 devaluation crisis.
As the value of the peso dropped by half, the U.S. Government in early 1995 bailed out Mexico
temporarily by assembling a 50-billion-dollar international stand-by fund, but Mexico's structural
problems continue to this day without being addressed, let alone resolved.
MABE's success stands out even more when contrasted with this structural mismanage-
ment at the national level.  One factor that may have contributed to MABE's success was the
degree of competition in the appliance industry.
Industrial organization and competitiveness.  Protection of domestic industries in
Mexico before the international opening had typically, though not invariably, led to the establish-
ment of inefficient, high-cost monopolistic industries behind a high tariff barrier, particularly in the
chemical, steel, energy, and other core sectors.
Yet, an effective industrial policy to protect newly emerging national industries need not
always lead to domestic monopolies.  A counterexample to the case typical of Mexico is offered
by Japan in the post-war decades where a protectionist policy with different institutional
presupposit ons brought fierce competition among domestic producers behind a high international
tariff barrier similar to hat of Mexico.  Firms that could hold their own in this domestic rivalry would
then find it relatively easy to enter international markets successfully, provided that the domestic
markets had grown broad enough to support adequ te economies of scale.
As part of an integrated policy, the government of Japan, unlike the government of Mexico,
promoted rapid growth of the middle class, in order to broaden internal markets.  Thus the expan-
sion of consumer markets for three "golden goods," refrigerators, washing machines, and tele-
vision sets, was strongly encouraged.  The government deliberately fostered the perception that
any family owning the three golden goods was in fact part of the middle class, a status to which
families in modern societies invariably aspire.  (Note that MABE produces two of the three golden
goods.)  Based on the expansion of domestic markets, Japanese firms then entered interational
markets.  The most visible example had been Japan's entry into world automobile markets as a
dangerous competitor at the point where the proportion of Japanese households that could afford
a car rose to some forty percent.
From the point of view of competition, the Mexican metal transforming industry in general,
and the appliance industry in particular, was in some ways more similar to typical Japanese indus-
tries than to typical Mexican industries.  Behind Mexico's tariff barrier a reasonable degree of com-
petition existed; this was reflected in the productivities in these industries which in some cases,
such as that of automobile parts and components, approximated productivities in the United
States.
In the major appliance industry there were about six to eight competing firms during the
post-war decades (Exhibit 9).  Therefore, the penalties for inefficiency in the domestic market
were greater in this industry than in many other industries, and the attainment of international
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competitiveness was correspondi gly easier.  Yet, to attain that goal, tradition l authoritarian
management styles had to be overcome, as MABE has successfully accomplished.
Before embarking on a detailed analysis of how MABE has been able to do so, it will be
convenient to present a brief overview of traditional versus modern management styles and their
cultural roots.  A more detailed discussion of the modern, knowledge-centered management ap-
proach, to which MABE successfully transitioned, is deferred to the Conceptual Framework
section, below.
Traditional and Modern Management Styles
Traditional authoritarian management styles have been contrasted with case studies of
private-sector Mexican companies with more modern management practices in a recent mono-
graph by Eva Kras of the University of Toronto.vii  As a foreigner, Kras softened her critique of
traditional Mexican management and allowed many of her points to emerge indirectly from the
contrast with better-managed firms.  Yet the Foreword to her study, written by a Mexican national,
pulled no punches.  By drawing together Kras' mesage conveyed largely between the lines, it
bluntly characterized managers operating in this style as:
" ... incapable of teamwork, fearful of delegating responsibility and authority to their
people, jealous of the development and creativity of their subordinates, dependent
on family politicking and 'influential connections,' ignorant of the imperatives of
quality and efficiency, unaware of the reality of the loyal and committed functioning
of the common Mexican laborer.  Self-satisfied in their own mediocrity, they are
protected by their outdated petty power."viii
The above description paints an extreme picture of the negative elements of the
traditional, authoritarian management style.ix  Y t, not many individual managers are likely to
exhibit all the worst features of the above stereotype.  More importantly, the characterization of the
traditional management style is notably one-sided.  It leaves out of consideration, on the other
side, those traditional cultural elements that manifest themselves in the negative in the au-
thoritarian mangement style but that are bound to play an important positive role once a
meaningful transit on to modern management practices is initated.  What, then, are these
potentially positive elements?
In Latin culture, the focus is on the person; relationships play an autonomous role; and
relationships are understood to require time to unfold and mature.  This is often toxic in an authori-
tarian management environment, yet can be a highly positive element in the emerging advanced
human-resource-management and customer-service context.  In U.S. and much of current in-
ternational culture, by contrast, the focus is on the task not the person; relati ships are expected
to play an instrumental not autonomous role; and speed and flexibility are emphasized over the
development of relationships.x  U.S. and international business cult re are functional but
somewhat dehumanized in comparison with Latin culture.  In analyzing MABE's accomplishments,
it will be important to focus on the construcive role of Latin cultural characteristics, from at least
two points of view:
 First, the transition to international management standards cannot succeed if it
comes to mean a loss of cultural identity for the individuals involved; the resistanc-
es would be overwhelming.  In an advanced international management context,
the typical Latin focus on the person and on relationships can offer substantial help
in achieving the transition appropriately; it did so in the case of MABE.
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 Second, as world business moves into the information era and both knowledge-
based businesses and services come to play an increasingly dominant economic
role, the Latin cultural emphasis on personal involvements and the need to nurture
relationships appears ever more in the light of an asset, while the U.S. and interna-
tional cultural orientation to tasks, speed, and functional relationships gradually
discloses its negative side, namely a reduced capacity to enter relaxed and
comfortable personal relationships.  In the Northwestern European countries and in
the United States, special programs are already being made available to busi-
nesses that depend critically on customer goodwill, to train employe s to behave
more graciously and less impersonally in their interactions with customers and the
public.  Latins need no such training; the desired attitudes permeate their cultu e.
MABE was able to benefit from this Latin characteristic in all of its customer service
relationships.
In terms of management styles, Mexico today is in transition.  Beside the case of MABE
discused in this study, a number of important examples of firms with progressive management
practices are presented in Vera Kras' monograph cited earlier.xi  In addition, the recent export per-
formance of the Mexican economy in the automobile sector and several other industries attests to
management success in individual firms, despite the poor managee t of the economy at the na-
tional level.
Given this brief background discusion of economic conditions, competition, and
management practices in Mexico, a summary overview of MABE is presented as it exists today.
MABE  Today: a Brief Overview
MABE to-day is a joint venture whose equity is split 52/48 between a group of Mexican
investors centered on the Berrondo and Saíz families on the one side and General Electric on the
other.  It is and has all along been under Mexican management.  MABE produces gas ranges, re-
frigerators, and washing machines in manufacturing plants located in five major cities in Mexico,
all of them on the country's principal export axis extending from the capital Northward to the U.S.
(Exhibits 6 and 7).  MABE also has a major technology development center in Queretaro.
The manufacturing plants employ approximately ten thousand people (Exhibit 3).  MABE's
domestic sales from these plants in 1994, the last normal year prior to the collapse of the Mexican
peso, were 1.6 million units (Exhibit 4) with a value of 480 million U.S. dollars, figured at an ex-
change rate of 3.1 pesos to the dollar.  During 1995, these domestic sales fell by twenty-two per-
cent to 1.3 million units.  In dollar terms, with the exchange rate well over 6 pesos to the dollar, the
drop has of course been much greater, while the cost of imported parts and compoents, in
national currency, has more than doubled.  In this regard, it is of critical importance that since the
peso crash MABE, with strategic counsel from GE, has accomplished a major substitution of im-
ported components by Mexican-supplied components.
MABE exports from Mexico (Exhibit 5) have increased rapidly over the years including the
current crisis year, in large part as a result of GE purchases which continued growing by some
sixteen percent between 1994 and 1995.  Total exports have reached 1.1 million units by 1994,
with a value of some 250 million U.S. dollars; thus total MABE sales in this year were 2.8 million
units with a value of the order of 730 million dollars.  During 1995 a further increase in exports, to
1.3 million units, has offset much of the drop of domestic sales; total sales fell by less than six
percent (Exhibits 1, 4, and 5).  While so far, only a modest proportion f these exports has gone to
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South America, the latter have grown some threefold between 1994 and 1995, offering great
promise for the future.
Through three joint ventures since 1993, the last one in Ecuador in 1995 with a new distri-
bution startup most recently in Peru, MABE's Mexican investors (under the EXIN legal identity)
have also acquired a regionally distributed manufacturing base in Venezuela, Colombia, and
Ecuador which is in the process of being integrated by cross-supply of parts and components.
Under current negotiations this manufacturing base is likely to be formally tr nsferred to MABE.
In 1994, sales from the first two ventures stood at 100 million dollars.  Thus the combined volume
of MABE and EXIN sales in all markets during this year was some 850 million dollars.
The MABE organization today operates through thirteen major divisi nal units (Exhibit 8)
whose directors report to the Managi g Director.  MABE's organization chart is thus flat at the top,
reflecting the influence of the corporate organizational philosophy of General Electric that aims to
give managers a large enough number of direct reports to make it next to impossible for them to
micromanage the operations for which they are responsible.  As with GE, though, this philosophy
has not yet trickled down fully; the median number of direct reports at the next lower level is five.
Important milestones in the history of the major appliance industry in Mexico and in the
corporate history of MABE are pres nted in Exhibits 9 and 10.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Bridging Cultural Gaps
MABE's need to plan for a workforce that would commute daily between the First World
and the Third World applies directly to one particular Mexican-U.S. joint venture yet at the same
time points to a more general issue that is at the core of the present study.
In to-day's rapidly globalizing information economy, how can we best integrate into corpo-
rate strategy the bridging of the cultural gaps that pose an ever-growing challenge to transnational
human resource management, namely the gap between different national cultures and with it,
typically, the gap between different corporate cultures?  In other words, what principles should
govern the corporation that aspires, beyond being transnational, to becoming truly transcultural?
While a number of topics related to this issue, such as the process of corporate culture
change, human resource management in a transnational environment, or the meaning and
centrality of work in different cultures, have received significant attention in recent business and
social science literature,xii there has been less general awareness of the need to focus on the
bridging of cultural differences as an integral part of transnation l corporate strategy.xiii
Indeed, a precondition for addressing that challenge appears to be the bridging of a more
fundamental cultural gap: the one that often separates corporate strategic decisonmakers from
human resources managers - and in the process not only marginalizes the human resource func-
tion but also places corpoate strategy under a handicap.  This problem has received inadequate
recognition in American business practice, even though such a cultural gap is more and more of a
disadvvantage in to-day's information-intensive global competitive environment in which high-level
human resources play a central role.  While in Japan, for example, the core decisionmaking group
of corporate officers often includes the chief human resources officer, in the U.S. this is hardly
ever the case.xiv
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The need to integrate corporate strategic and human resource functions arises from their
close mutual interdep ndency under conditions of rapid change.  Thus, human resource manag -
ment must at all times adjust to the firm's overall strategic needs.  As strategy implementation
depends on effective human resource support, human resource management must constantly
create new skills and capabilities that are requir d for meeting ever-changing strategic challenges.
Conversely, strategic decisions must adapt to actual and potential human resource availabilities.
Particular strategic challenges must be evaluated with regard to their human resource implica-
tions: can their skill requirements be met?  Do they adequately exploit the opportunities provided
by existing and potential core human resource competencies?
Therefore, effective transcultural corporate functioning to-day requires the bridging of at
least three major cultural gaps:
 The gap between different national cultures - the most readily perceived gap.
 The gap between different corporate cultures - a gap that typically arises in trans-
national joint ventures but often also creates problems in multi-component
corporate operations within a single national economy.
 The gap between corporate strategic decision-making and corporate human
resource management - the most fundamental gap.
The concept of bridging cultural gaps also provides a usful perspective when addressing
differences between advanced and lagging corporate components; or when dealing with gender,
racial, ethnic, tribal, language, or religious differences in an organizational context.
To be effective, a management orientation to the closing of cultural gaps must operate
within the framework of a modern management approach whose key concepts, now emerging
from the international management literature, are rapidly spreading among top-performing com-
panies worldwide.  Key points of such an approach, which will be referred to here as being "know-
ledge-centered," are sumarized below.
The Knowledge-Centered Management Approach
Focus on the human capital resource is the categorical imperative of the knowledge-cen-
tered management approach.
In to-day's business environment, the human capital embodi d in highly knowledgeable,
educated, trained, and skilled human resources at all levls of a corporation constitute an
increasing fraction of social wealth at the corp ration's disposal, coming to rival the value of con-
ventional physical and financial assets.  None of this human capital can by definition be owned;
any part of it may be withdrawn on short notice.  The corporation is thus in fact far more heavily
leveraged than would appear and must be managed with increasing attention to the human
capital resource.  This brings supposedly "soft" policy issues involving teamwork, organizational
and personal relations, as well as the continual upgrading of human resources, into the core of top
corporate policymaking concern.
In a business context, knowledge embraces effective ways of dealing both with technology
and with the organizational relations that promote collective learning.  Such learning is required for
the harmonization of streams of technology and for cooperati n in directing them toward an
agreed objective.
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According to World Bank estimates cited earlier,xv human capital represents the prepon-
derant part of social wealth in the industrially advanced countries.  Thus it is not surprising that
strategic human-resource considerations are advancing toward a position of equality with financial
considerations in key business decisions; access to high-level human resources and the ability to
channel their effective use plays an ever-increasing role in global competitiveness.
In the public mind to-day knowledge, as applied to business, still primarily means high
technology, but the trend is moving beyond a predominantly technological emphasis.  Effective
coordination of the activities of highly educated people within a fast-changing information envi-
ronment calls for pioneering advances.  The latter are needed in areas such as open information
flows, lifelong education, team learning, the building of core competencies, mobilization of the
firm's latent knowledge and creativity, and the involvement of entire organizations in strategic goal
setting and implementation.  With it all, there has to be a transiio  from authoritarian to nondirec-
tive business leadership that poses challenges and devolves power, in order to let people at lower
levels find ways of meeting these challenges.
Important aspects of a knowledge-centered management appro ch have been described
in a variety of sources in the business and organizational literature.  The conceptual framework
adopted for this study attempts to integrate these aspects, with the transcultural dimension added.
Key sources that overlap in many respects have been the writings of Gary Hamel and C.K.
Prahalad; Peter Senge; Michael Porter; and Peter Block (cited below).  These have been
complemented, particularly in view of the focus of this study on a General Electric joint venture, by
inclusion of conceptions arising out of GE's corporate practices under Jack Welch.  The present
attempt at integration has also been greatly influenced by years of discussion of core topics
between the author and his colleague at Cornell, Alan McAdams of the Johnson Graduate School
of Management.  The "knowledge-centered management approach" set out here incorporates
many elements of McAdams' "New Industrial Paradigm" which he presents in his Management
Consulting course.
The knowledge-centered management approach responds to ongoi  changes in our
business environment.  Key aspects of this approach are briefly summarized here under four
headings: (i) competitive advantage; (ii) strategic intent and core competencies; (iii) devolution of
powerxvi and nondirective leadership; and (iv) team learning and organizations without boundaries.
The concepts developed under these four headings have close mutual interre at ons and add up
to an integrated whole that marks the path of industrial society into the future.
Competitive Advantage.xvii  Competitive advantage is the capacity to keep ahead of
change.  In given lines of business, static advantages - human-resource and technological
capabilities, acess to markets and suplies, posit onal strengths in relation to rivals and competi-
tors - are perishable assets apt to be eroded by change.  Ultimately, the only way to sustain com-
petitive advantage is to keep upgrading assets continually.  Preferential access to the supply of
existing factors must be extended by the creation of new specialized factors; markets can seldom
be indefinitely sheltered by entry barriers and must be continually upgraded by innovation.  At the
corporate level, the ongoing sharing of activities and transferring of critical skills between different
lines of business is essential for sustained competitiv ness and growth.
Strategic intent and core competencies.  Under rapid, massive structural change, effec-
tive corporate strategy canot take the traditional form of straegic planing.  With the predictive
horizon becoming shorter and shorter in most industries, there is an erosion of corporate control
and direction because conventional strategic plans reveal more about today's problems than
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about tomorrow's oportunities.  Stability cannot come from projecting the presnt forward incre-
mentally.xviii
 Strategic intent.  A stable strategy can emerge only from a clear purpose that tran-
scends the past: a straegic intent.  Such a strategic intent chains the future - the
road to which is far from clear and is indeed often "off the map" - backward to the
present.  The important question is not: "How will next year be diff rent from this
year?" but "What must we do differently next year to get closer to our strategic in-
tent?"xix
 Challenges.  An appropriate straegic intent can hold over decades (such as Can-
on's "Beat Xerox"; or Coca-Cola's "Put Coke within arm's reach of every consumer
in the world."xx)  Therefore, it must be transl ted into specific shorter-term challeng-
es that can change as often as yearly, in function of the fast-changing pressures
and opportunities emanating from the firm's enviro ment.
 Core competencies.  The challenges involve the firm's core competencies which
represent the outcome of collective learni g in the organization, especially how to
coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple streams of technolo-
gies.xxi  More fundamentally, core competencies stand for knowledge: both person-
al knowledge resting on lifelong education and social knowledge mbodied in tech-
nologies and their cooperative implementation in a given concrete production
setup.  Existing core competencies define what the firm is currently capable of
accomplishing; challenges typically involve finding ways of expanding the firm's
core competencies and acquiring new ones.  In the long run, competitiven ss
derives from buildng core competencies that spawn unanticipated products.
Devolution of power and nondirective leadership. To succeed, strategic intent must
have the total commitment of the entire organization; it cannot work by senior management mak-
ing strategy and lower levels executing it.  A traditional strategy hierarchy undermines competi-
tiveness by fostering an elitist view of management that tends to disenfranchise most of the orga-
nization.
 Devolution of power.  Challenges represent short-term straegic objectives that are
formulated with critical input by upper management levels but are not to be pur-
sued under their control, much less their micro-management.  Jack Welch's
conception of the need to flatten the corporate pyramid that has been successfully
put in practice within GE serves precisely this purpose.xxii  Devolution of power to
all levels of the organization is essential to finding and implementing ways of meet-
ing major challenges, because doing so requires mobilizing all manifest and latent
resources of knowledge, energy, imagination, and creativity of the entire organiza-
tion.  Such a harnessing of the "wisdom of the anthill"xxiii in the only way of rising to
severe challenges, to which no appropriate response is known at the time when
they are posed.  Conversely, the devolution of power that makes mobilization
possible is the only way to ensure that the challenges the organization poses itself
are worthy challenges, capable of continually honing the organization's edge of
competitiveness.
 Nondirective leadership.xxiv In to-day's business world, the sum total of the knowl-
edge dispersed throughout the corporation's personel greatly exceeds the ability
of management to comprehend, let alone to control.  The hierarchical command-
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and-control management style of the past, modeled on the military, is thus inade-
quate to the task of mobilizing the capabilities of the organization in service of its
continued competitiven ss and growth in an ever-changing environment.  There is
an increasingly urgent need for a more demanding, ondirective leadership style
that develops, unfolds, coordinates, and gives scope to the organization's human
resources.  At best, the functions of such leadership are performed with a low
profile that gives the feeling to all persons involved in meeting challenges that they
have done most of it by thems lves.
 Stewardship.  Stewardship is a concept that goes to the heart of the issues of de-
volution of power and nondirective leadership.  As summarized in the theme of
choosing service over self-interest,xxv it expresses the ethical aspiration that pro-
vides direction to the transition from the authoritarian to the knowledge-centered
management style.  Though this aspiration points beyond what is concretely attain-
able, it reflects the reality that in the emerging knowledge-based economy, the
desirable balnce between our intersts as isolated individuals and our interests as
social beings is shifting in the social direction.  If we want to work for well-func-
tioning, competitive organiz tions, then we must restrain somewhat our individual
drives for power and prestige and become more oriented to the needs of others.
This shift - which parallels the growth in our personal lives from adolescent egotism
to more mature interpersonal relationships - is a precondition for nondirective
leadership.  It also emerges as a precondition for the effective transcultural func-
tioning of individuals and organizations.
Team learning and organizations without boundaries.  Nondirective leadership can
work only when information is not hoarded as an instrument of control, either at each level of
authority or withn vertical chimneys that restrict information to particular organizational units.
There must be a free flow of information and broad access to it throughout all parts and all levels
of the organization - and even beyond - if the process of team learning, which is at the core of a
knowledge-centered management approach, is to be given scope.
 Team learning.  Team learning expands, pools, and mobilizes the knowledge of an
organization.  According to Senge,xxvi systems thinking, personal mastery, mental
models, and the building of shared visions are the basic social technologies or "dis-
ciplines" that support the most important discipline, that of team learning.  The
latter is the central survival skill of organizations in to-day's fast-changing, infor-
mation-laden business world.  It is the process of aligning and developing the ca-
pacity of a team to create the results its members desire.  Key dimensions of team
learning within an organization include insightful t inking about complex issues;
innovative, coordinated action; and the interlocking of multiple teams through
shared team members.  Team learning requires not only free circulation of informa-
tion within the organization, but more than that, open discussion and dialogue that
transcends the presentation and defense of individual, politically tinged points of
view.  Only in this way can a genuinely collective thought process get established
whose outcome goes beyond any one indiv dual's understanding. Leadership roles
within a learning organizat on do not disappear but undergo a qualitative change in
the direction of facilitating, supporting, and enrichi g the process of team learning.
 Boundary-lessness.  The idea of team learning writ large leads to a qualitatively
new conception.  When team learning expands to the limits of entire conglomerate
organizations, including their alliances and joint ventures, and then spills over into
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the social web of productive interactions beyond, we have arrived at the organiza-
tion without boundaries, a conception that arose as the culmination of corporate
culture change within General Electric under Jack Welch.xxvii  This cumulative
culture change began with the flattening of the corporate pyramid to avoid micro-
management; continued with "Work-Outs" that systematically confronted
managers with ideas for change coming from below; moved on to the wide sharing
of all significant advances ("Best Practices") within the organization; and finally led
to a perspective encouraging free and productive interactions even beyond the
organization's own limits.  In Welch's words, "In a boundary-less company,
suppliers aren't outsiders.  They are drawn closer and become trusted partners ...
Customers' vision of their needs and the company's view become identical ...  The
boundary-less company blurs the divisions between internal functions; it recog-
nizes no distinctions between 'domestic' and 'foreign' operations; and it ignores or
erases group labels such as 'management,' 'salaried,' and 'hourly' which get in the
way of people working together."xxviii
The above core concepts, integrated with the conception of bridging of different cultures
that has been set out in the preceding subsection, will help to interpret and evaluate MABE's
historical performance and its emergence as a modern transnational corporation.
The Dynamics of Ongoing Change: Analyzing MABE's Performance
MABE as a Mexican corporate organization, and later as a joint venture with GE but under
Mexican management throughout, has over the past dozen years made a spectacular transition
from a predominantly traditional management style to the new knowledge-centered management
approach.  In the process of its association with GE, it has abor ed core aspects of GE's
management practices and corporate culture but has successfully maintained its own identity.  In
interaction with GE, MABE has also found a distinctive way of dealing with transcultural issues.
We now turn to a presentation and analysis, within the conceptual framework developed in
this section, of how MABE has achieved a transition from a traditional to a knowledge-centered
management approach and how it has bridged the three basic cultural gaps in order to do so.
The next section reviews how MABE's latent potential for the transition developed from its
founding year in 1947 to the critical year of 1984 when traditional management practices were
decisively confronted.  The subsequent section analyzes the formation of the MABE-GE
partnership.  The third survey section covers MABE's transformation into the modern transnational
company we see in operation today.
The study concludes with conclusions concerning what MABE's experience contributes to
our understanding of the transcultural foundations of success in transnational joint ventures, with
emphasis on the development of human resources and core competencies.
EVOLUTION OF MABE'S LATENT POTENTIAL'S
Early Historyry
MABE was founded in 1947 by Basque immigrants to Mexico, Egon Mavardi, Francisco
Berrondo, and Luis Berrondo Sr., brother of Francisco.  A third Berrondo brother, Antonio, soon
joined the enterprise.  MABE deriv s its name from the Mavardi and Berrondo family names.  In
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the Fifties, Egon Mabardi sold out his founder's share to investors in the B rrondo and Saíz
families; from that time to the present, these families controled the enterp ise.
Francisco Berrondo Sr. acted as Chief Executive Officer until his death after which Luis
Berrondo Sr. took over the leadership of the company.  The current chief executive officer, Luis
Berrondo Jr., is Luis Sr.'s son.
The immigrant background of the founders - one of whom, Luis Sr., continues as an im-
portant influence on MABE's decisions to the present day - leads to some key questions, given
MABE's exceptional ability later in its history to operate across cult ral divides.
Did the Basque vs. Spanish, or the Basque vs. Mexican cross-cultural tension that the
founders' life experiences brought to the new ent rprise, give MABE an important advantage from
the start?  Did the industrial and business experience that they brought with them from the eco-
nomically more advanced European environment play an important role?  Had perhaps even the
harsh realit es of the Spanish civil war, which hit the Basque country with particular ferocity, taught
the founders important lessons about the interconnectedness of economics and politics that were
helpful in their new environment?  Though these questions might be hard to answer in a
convincing manner, they must be raised in view of MABE's success in operating across the Mexi-
co-U.S. cultural divide and the company's exceptional willingness to enter a foreign arena in South
America.xxix
Among the important factors mentioned within MABE in the above connection is the
coherence and mutual support of the post-civil-war Spanish immigration to Mexico.  Another factor
emphasized is the culture of work and the culture of quality characterizing this immigration, which
has given rise to some highly successful and visible enterprises, such as the Aurrera and Supe-
rama supermarket chains or the Vip's restaurant chain.
Certainly, MABE's transcultural potential did not disclose itself in any obvious way during
the early years when its management style and corporate culture blended into the traditional ways
of the industry. After being established, MABE produced mostly metal kitchen cabinets and did not
enter the major appliance industry until 1953 when it began manufacturing gas ranges.
The more sophisticated metal stamping operations involved in the production of gas
ranges represented an upgrading of the metal bending and cutting capabilities developed by the
company in the preceding years in kitchen cabinet production.  This upgrading was the beginning
of the build-up and ext nsion of core competencies that continued over MABE's entire corporate
history.
At the time of MABE's entry into the gas range market in Mexico, two other firms, Acros
and Delher, were already serving this market.  The major appliance industry in the 1940's and
50's also included four firms producing refrigerators and three firms producing washing machines
(see Exhibits 9 and 10).  There was thus a significant degree of competition in the industry.
A key event from the point of view of MABE's later transcultural functioning occurred when
Luis Berrondo Sr. retained Jaime Dupuis as President of the company, a post he occupies to the
present day.  Dupuis has been widely described both within MABE and within General Electric as
truly bicultural; he had lived from the age of six to nineteen in the United States and is said to
function with equal ease in a Mexican or U.S. business environment.  He was eventually to
become a critical asset for MABE in creating he MABE-GE synergy.
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Of equally decisive importance for the fortunes of MABE was the circumstance that the
second generation in the Berrondo and Saíz families, which was soon to take over key
responsibilit es on the board and in the management of the company, has had significant
international experi nce before taking management positions in MABE.  Luis Berrondo Jr. worked
for six years as chief executive officer of a Venezuelan corporation, Tanques Para Gas (Gas
Cylinders), in which the Berrondo family had an interest.  While there, he organized three joint
ventures, two of which were transnational (Venezuela-Mexico and Venezuela-U.S.).  His cousin
José, born in Spain and also repsenting the second generation of post-civil-war migration to
Mexico, received an MBA from the University of California and brought back from the U.S. many
modern business management ideas; upon his entry into the business he had the reputation of a
young turk who was eager to make a significant contribution and to do so fast.
These were some of the elements that constituted the background for MABE's succesful
confrontation with its first crucial decision point that brought with it a notable transition from a tradi-
tional to a modern management culture and a commitment to a breakthrough in growth.
First Moment of Truth: The Dilemma of Exit from the Industry or Fast Growth through Inter-
national Alliances
The specific situation within the company that eventually led to the first and truly existenial
moment of truth in the history of MABE began incubating with the decentralization of part of
refrigerator production from Mexico City to Queretaro in 1976.
Prior to this time, all of MABE's production operations in all lines were concentrated in one
block of industrial property that the company owned near the Mexico City airport.  As MABE grew,
factory buildings were added and expanded within this one block which over time becam  more
and more confining.  In 1976, when the decision was taken to initiate a serious export push, it was
simultaneously decided to decentralize the production of single-door refrigerators out of Mexico
City to a new plant to be built in Queretaro.
A look at the geography of MABE's present producing plants (Exhibit 7) indicates that the
Queretaro site was chosen with a view to locational advantage; it was the major urban center
closest to Mexico City on Mexico's main export route to the North.  The Queretaro plant started
producing in 1978 and became a center of expansion over the years (Exhibit 10).  Because of its
export focus, and because it was managed by José Berrondo who implemented management
concepts acquired during his U.S. education, this plant from the start emphasized quality, l bor
training, and modern management practices; it never had any labor problems.
Not so the main operation in Mexico City.  By this time the plant complex had a twenty-
year history of entrenched, antiquated management and labor practices.  The authoritarian
management style at the top has been characterized by MABE's current Chief Executive Officer,
Luis Berrondo Jr., as "solar management."  Luis Berrondo Sr., the President at the time, and
Jaime Dupuis, the CEO, were the twin suns around whom the entire management system
revolved.  Relationships were authoritarian down the management hierarchy; they were particu-
larly rigid and arbitrary at the factory foreman level.
Moreover, beginning with 1976 the national economic and political scene underwent
significant changes that brought a devaluation from 12.5 to 25 pesos to the dollar as well as in-
creasing industrial centralization, expropriations, and protectionism.  The years between 1982 and
1984 were particularly severe crisis years for the Mexican appliance industry.  Private firms were
weakened by price controls, while some previously failing firms, taken over by the govrnment,
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competed in a tight market with special government support.  The crisis period brought about
consolidation within the industry; the government was eager to sell back ownership to solvent
firms in the private sector.
Over this entire period the role of unions, especially in the capital, became more and more
politicized and there was much union rivalry, with agitation and contested representational elec-
tions.  MABE's operations in the Mexico City plant were increasingly caught between antiquated
management practi es on the one hand, and union power politics on the other.
Escape from the multiple inefficiencies inherent in the above situation required two major,
simultaneous commitments.  First, the entrenched, antiquated, authoritarian management
structures in Mexico City had to be liquidated and modern managee t practices had to be laid in
place, modeled on MABE's much more progressive management culture already successfully
established for several years in the Queretaro plant.  Second, the unions which had a vested
political interest in the status quo had to be confronted.  Undertaking these commitments and
acting on them carried high risks; yet proceeding with temporary compromises and putting off
fundamental change involved costs in both money and workforce morale that grew heavier with
every passing year.
The crucial decisions, finally undertaken in 1984, coincided with a generational shift in top
management.  By this time Luis Berrondo Jr. had returned from Venezuela and had spent a full
year studying the operations of MABE from an office within company headquarters but taking no
part in management decisions.  Subsequently he was named Director General of the firm and
took over many top responsibilities from his father while Jaime Dupuis continued as President.
In recounting the history of that period, Luis Berrondo Jr. stated that even though he re-
turned from Venezuela with a clear understanding between himself and his father that he would
take over running MABE, the company was by no means handed to him on a silver platter.  He
came to be included in the top triumvirate running the company, but in a characteristic cultural
difference between the U.S. and Mexico, no intent ever existed, to this day, to spell out with preci-
sion the authority and responsibilities of each of the three top men.  Sensitive communications
and mutual adjustments were handled by indirection on the basis of personal relationships, not in
a direct manner, as would be the case in the U.S., on the basis of interrelations b tween func-
tional tasks.  Luis Jr. had to make a sustained effort over the years to acquire de facto authority in
specific areas because Dupuis was a strong president.
It did fall to Luis Jr., none the less, to take major responsibilty for the decision of whether
or not to take on the risks of fundamental change, notwithstanding that both his father and Dupuis
had definitive say in the matter.
Luis Berrondo Jr. recalled that by late 1984 it had become clear to him that from the point
of view of MABE's investors, only two real options existed.  The business either had to be sold; or
else the risks of fundamental structural change had to be confronted and the renewed company
had to make a commitment to achieve a breakthrough in growth by means of international allianc-
es.  With its traditional management structure and problems in Mexico City and at its existing
scale of operations, MABE was subject to too many pressures and uncertainties, even though
among the firms in the appliance industry, it was the least wounded by the problems of the
industry during the period of the national devaluation crisis.
At the moment of truth before the end of 1984, Luis Berrondo Jr. came down
strongly on the side of fundamental structural change and a commitent to fast
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growth.  He succeeded in carrying his father and Dupuis along with him in this
decision, despite the more conservative personal inclinations of the two older men.
Implementing the structural change option.  When facing up to this critical decision,
Luis Berrondo Jr. had at his disposal a plan for fundamental change including key reorganization
proposals that had been worked out with broad management participation, above all that of Juan
Diego Oliva, José Berrondo's human resources director in MABE's excellent new Queretaro
operation.  Input into the plan included formal studies, some of which were based on worker int -
views.  The plan involved four principles:
 The problems facing MABE in Mexico City were, over the long run, of the
company's own making.
 Labor unrest was ultimately rooted in workers' justified resentments.
 A strategy of change had to start out with ths recognition.
 There had to be a housecleaning before a new management culture could be
established.
By 1985, the plan was in full execution.  A new culture of work teams and more open
communications was being established, with emphasis on the plants in Mexico City; worker rights
and needs were being fully respected; and a major management and worker training effo t had
been put in motion.
Implementing the fast growth option.  For MABE to achieve a breakthrough in growth
meant a commitment to building or acquiring additional gas range fabrication capacity beyond that
available at the Mexico City plant which was incapable of further expansion.  It meant acquisit on
of a complete product line in major applinces by buying firms in the industry that were willing to
participate in the effort to attain growth.  Last but not least, it meant seeking association with a
partner enterprise that would give MABE access to advanced internat onal manufacturing tech-
nology, export markets, and modern management practices.
At the moment of decision, MABE had the advantage of previus contacts with General
Electric dating back to 1982, the year in which GE had approached MABE with a possible interest
in a joint venture.  These contacts had been maintained primarily between Dupuis on behalf of
MABE and Robert Reid, General Manager of the Latin American operations of GE Appliances.
The two men got along very well from the start and eventually developed a close friendship
involving both their families.  With MABE's commitment to growth, Berrondo and Dupuis now had
a greatly increased interst in intensive joint venture negotiations with GE which were subse-
quently caried out on a continuing basis mostly by Dupuis.  Yet, both MABE and GE also con-
sidered other possible partners.  This process led to MABE's second critical decision point, to be
presented in the next major section.
Retrospective evaluation.  This first moment of truth was the most important in MABE's
history.  It involved the existential decision of selling the company versus committing it to funda-
mental change and growth; thus it was a precondition for all of MABE's later successes.  In retro-
spect, it is essential to analyze the dynamics of change.  What provided the motivation and the
push?  And more importantly, what energized such a fundamental commitment to change?
By the time the commitment to change was made, MABE's operations in Mexico City had
reached a point where not taking action would have involved more and more severe costs.  The
imperative for change was palpable; but so were the resistances.  These were both internal, from
a conservative management culture at the top, disinclined to take risks that could be bypassed by
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compromises; and external, from the trade unions that were politically benefiting from the status
quo.  Many companies in a comparable situat on would have continued to put off the decision until
most sources of company strength were erodd.  What enabled MABE to bite the bullet?
In this connection, we have to ask whether at the mom nt f truth MABE did or did not
possess a strategic intent which would have compelled change?  The answer is that a strategic
intent could at most have been implicit because the company was being pulled in opposite direc-
tions.
Pulling one way, three strategic factors were moving the company in a direction that might
be regarded as representing an implicit strategic intent to achieve primacy in the national industry.
The first such factor was an ongoi  commitment to exports, starting in 1974 with gas
ranges and expanding from 1977 on with refrigerators (Exhibit 5).  A commitment to exports could
not have been sustained without an underlying culture of quality that MABE's founders had origi-
nally brought with them from Europe; lacking this, successful entry into export markets could not
have been contemplated.
The second strategic factor was the modern organizational culture implanted in the Qu -
retaro operation since its inception in 1976 by its director, José Berrondo, the family's young turk
bent on rapid modernization.  In this, he had the help of Juan Diego Oliva, his human resource
chief over the critical early years of the Queretaro plant, who in 1982 was promoted to corp rate
human resource director.  Oliva played a key role in arranging for the studies and in working out
the plan of action that underlay Luis Berrondo Jr.'s thrust for change at the moment of truth.
The third strategic factor was the generational transition that had acquired sufficient mo-
mentum by late 1984 to give Luis Berrondo Jr. a decisive voice in persuading his father and
Dupuis to accept fundamental structural change at the crucial moment.  The transitio  required
exceptional strength of character on both sides of the generational divide.  It is rare within the
Latin cultural tradition and all the more admirable, for a father to hand over to his son
progressively more of the top authority and move on to the role of senior corporate statesman.  It
is equally rare and admirable for the son to do so with a grace that retains the full backing and
counsel of his father, one of the firm's founders and key investors.  The generational transition,
moreover, also involved the relationship of Luis Berrondo Jr. to Jaime Dupuis, both of whom
handled the transition with a similar grace.  Dupuis transferred authority gradually but made Luis
Jr. fight hard for each step.  It was not until the turn of the Nineties that Luis Berrondo Jr. began
implicitly emerging as the de facto center of authority at MABE; at the same time Jaime Dupuis,
like Luis Berrondo Sr., gradually moved over to the role of senior corporate statesman, a role in
which he remains highly active to the present day.
The combined pull of the above three strategic factors has in fact allowed MABE to weath-
er the preceding crisis years in better shape than the other industry participants.  The company
was, however, at the same time also being pulled in the opposite direc ion by the resistances and
inertia of its entrenched old-line operations in Mexico City.
MABE's implicit strategic target underwent a qualitative change with the rsolution
of the sell-or-grow dilemma.  What resulted was the first instance in which MABE
came to be motivated by a clear strategic intent that explicitly comitted the
company to fundamental change, fast growth, and the pursuit of internation-
al competitiveness.
The Best-Practice Case of MABE-GE WP 96-12
Page 30
Seeking an appropriate strategic alliance held out the promise of critical assistance on the
last two objectives.  The partner in such an alliance turned out to be General Electric.
ESTABLISHING THE MABE-GE PARTNERSHIP
Second Moment of Truth: Commitment to the Joint Venture with GE
The signing of the joint venture agreement with General Electric represented MABE's sec-
ond moment of truth.  Without this commitment, the company's fortunes would have taken a com-
pletely different turn.
General Electric made the first approach to MABE about a possible joint venture in 1982.
GE had been active in Mexico for almost a century, since 1896.  In the early 1980's a joint venture
in which GE held a 49% share, CONFAD, was producing refrigerators and washers in Mexico and
was competing with MABE in the market for refrigerators.  In the U.S., beginning with the acces-
sion of Jack Welch as CEO in April, 1981, General Electric was reviewing its operations under the
guideline that a business had to be, or had to have the potential of fast becoming, either numb r
one or number two in its line, else it would be divested.  In keeping with this approach, GE actually
divested 118 businesses between 1981 and 1983.  At the same time, GE also made huge in-
vestments, including $500 million between 1980 and 1983 spent on modernizing its major appli-
ance group.xxx
In connection with the above major investments, GE Appliances h d earlier conducted a
broad survey of its market in the United States.  In this survey consumer  had been asked, among
other questions, what brand of gas range they were considering to buy?  Twenty-five percent of
respondents specified the GE brand, even though at that point General Electric was not marketing
gas ranges!xxxi  Given the oportunity disclosed by this survey, GE turned to independent U.S.
suppliers for sourcing gas ranges, including Tappan and Magic Chef,xxxii but at the time of the
initial approach to MABE, was not satisfied with its existing arrangements and was exploring alter-
natives.
Mexico was highly attractive to General Electric as a potential supply location, for several
reasons.  GE wanted to produce gas ranges to U.S. quality standards at substantially lower cost
than could be attained by U.S. suppliers.  Productivity per labor hour in Mexico was beginning to
approach U.S. levels in some industries closely similar to the major appliance industry, particularly
in automobile parts and components, at hourly wage rates that were five to ten times lower than in
the U.S.xxxiii  In these industries, Mexico had the lowest labor costs world-wide on a unit produc-
tivity basis.  Among foreign supply locations, Mexico also had a transport cost advantage com-
pared with all countries other than Canad , a higher labor cost area.  Finally, product characteris-
tics already established in the Mexican market were somewhat more closely similar to those in the
U.S. market than those of potential European supply locations where product design and distribu-
tion were strongly influenced by national cult ral patterns differing from those of the U.S.xxxiv
MABE was selected by General Electric for an approach in part because MABE was
widely respected in Mexico as a strong competitor with good technical standards.  In the technical
area MABE was, for example, the first to use polyurethane insulation in refrigerators when other
producers in Mexico were still using glass fiber, and was also the first to introduce gas ranges with
sealed burners in Mexico.  Beyond this, MABE's original selection for an approach by GE was
perhaps even more influenced by the consideration that MABE had top leadership, in the person
of Jaime Dupuis, with whom key GE executives could easily communicate.
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GE saw a great commercial potential in the U.S. market for gas ranges, but it could not
realize that potential on its own because its competition had well-established experience and com-
petence in cost-effective production involving advanced technology and design.  GE was therefore
seeking a partner organization that could give it a substantial production cost advant ge rooted in
lower wages while being capable, in a major joint effort with GE, of coming up to the quality stand-
ards demanded by the U.S. market.
A suggestion advanced from the MABE side but disputed from the side of GE was that GE
might also have been seeking a partner with well-estabished, dynamic distribution and marketing
capability in Mexico, because GE had not been able to bring about real growth in its appliance
business in this country.  The purported cause of this would have been GE's corporate culture.
Any capable executive on the fast track would supposedly have felt highly constrained if he had
remained in any given assignment for more than two years; yet two years were not enough for an
American executive to get his bearings in the Mexican cultural environment.  As soon as GE
executives were beginning to feel somewhat comfortable with Mexican culture, according to this
point of view, they were alre dy packing their bags.
In retrospect, it is both hard and not particularly relevant to decide how persuasive each
side's interpretation might be concerning the motivations involved in exploration of the possibility
of a joint venture.  What matters is that the joint venture did come into being and was hugely suc-
cessful.
After MABE faced its first moment of truth in 1984 and opted for fundamental change, fast
growth, and international competitiveness, it thereby established an explicit strategic intent.  The
first challenge under this strategic intent was to find and enter into alliance with an appropriate
partner organization that would provide acess for MABE to international markets, advanced
manufacturing technology, and a modern management culture.  Luis Berrondo Jr. and Jaime
Dupuis adressed this challenge by moving the joint venture negotiations with General Electric
into high gear.  Without the intensive and focused work of the following three years, in the course
of which Dupuis carried much of the negotiating load, the 1987 signing of the joint venture a-
greement could not have been realized.
None the less, before finally signing an agreement in 1987, both GE and MABE
considered alternative joint venture options.  MABE was looking at a possible association with
Whirlpool.  In 1983 Genral Electric actually entered a joint venture with Grupo Industrial Saltillo, a
producer mainly of washing machines; but GE maintained the right to pull its refrigrator oper-
ations out of this agreem nt and associating itself with a third party in the manufacture of refriger-
ators.  This opened the door to the MABE-GE joint venture.
At this point, however, General Electric was also looking at the Monterrey-based Vitro
group as an alternative to MABE.  In the 80's, the Vitro group had become a major power in appli-
ances with a series of acquisitions.  From GE's point of view, the choice between MABE and Vitro
boiled down to a simple tradeoff.  Vitro was subtantially stronger in capital resources, but
MABE's management culture had by this time become far more progressive and efficient than that
of Vitro, not only in MABE's Queretaro operations, but also in Mexico City.
The choice on behalf of General Electric, whether to sign with MABE or Vitro, was finally
made in favor of MABE by Bruce Enders, Vice President of Marketing of GE Appliances.  The wis-
dom of this choice was amply confirmed some years later by the debacle of Corning's joint ven-
ture in consumer housewares with Vitro in 1993, which Corning, acording to press reports, attrib-
uted to Vitro's antiquated, hierarchical management structure.  This structure created an
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impossible bottleneck for timely, flexible management performance by centralizing authority for all
important decisions at the very topxxxv - precisely the same traditional "solar" management style
that MABE had successfully shed when it faced up to its first moment of truth.
The joint venture agreement gave General Electric a 48 percent equity share in the
expanded MABE organization.  GE contributed the refrigerator component separated out from its
joint venture with Grupo Industrial Saltillo, plus 25 million U.S. dollars in cash.  Management re-
sponsibility for the expanded MABE organization created by the infusion of equity by GE was as-
signed entirely to MABE; GE, however, was to provide management traing and technological
support to MABE for the ongoing upgrading of quality, productivity, and the expansion of exports
to the U.S. and Latin American markets.  The agreement, most crucially, also provided for building
a new plant with a major infusion of GE design, technology, and management experience, to sup-
ply gas ranges for marketing by GE in the United States.
Following the signing of this agreement in 1987, MABE went ahead rapidly with a series of
actions in line with its strategic intent of structural change, fast growth, and international competi-
tiveness:
 MABE took out 70 million dollars in credit and with the agreed decisive input by
GE, initiated the design and construction of a major new green-field plant at San
Luis Potosi for gas range exports.  The plant began producti n in 1990 (see
Exhibits 6 and 7).
 Within a month of the signing of the agreement, MABE acquired IEM-
Westinghouse (Industrias Electricas de Mexico), a firm producing mainly gas
ranges and refrigerators that had been taken into public ownership by the
Echeverria administration and was sold by the government to MABE in 1987.
 Within two years, at GE's initiative MABE bought out the entire major appliance
capacity of the Genral Electric-Grupo Industrial Saltillo joint venture, mostly wash-
ing machines.  Thereby, relying on GE's worldwi e experience in the industry,
MABE rounded out its own major appliance lines.
With these expansions and acquisitions, by 1989 MABE had a fifty percent share of Mexi-
co's major appliance market which it has maintained ever since (Exhibit 2).  Vitro has maintained
a market share of some forty percent, with ten percent of the market served by smaller producers.
Evaluating the context of the second moment of truth.  The question must be raised:
what made the MABE-GE interaction as sucessful as it turned out to be, both during the years of
negotiation of the joint venture agreement and afterwards, in the implementation phase?
Here the ability of the principals to transcend and bridge both their national and corporate
cultures must be ascribed a major role.  On the Mexican side Luis B rrondo Jr. and especially
Jaime Dupuis with his U.S.-Mexican bicultural background, as well as Luis' cousin Francisco
(Paco) Berrondo, were the key players.  On the General Electric side, by all accounts a major
share of the credit belongs to Robert (Bob) Reid of GE Appliances in Louisville, Kentucky.  At the
practical level of ongoing meetings where the devil is in the details, Dupuis and Reid had the
exceptional ability to work together with a completely shared cultural understanding.  This joint
and simultaneous understanding of both cultures allowed them to shape the course of future ac-
tion called for in the formal agreement in such a way that both Mexican and U.S. sensibilities
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would be respected and accom odated, from the weightiest economic issues down to the
smallest nuances that symbolically reflect mutual respect and good faith.
Before moving on to the implementation phase of th MABE-GE joint venture agreement,
it is important to note that in the same year in which the agreement was signed, the third moment
of truth of MABE passed so quietly that it went almost unnoticed.
Third Moment of Truth: Establishment of a Close Linkage Between Strategic Coordination
and Human Resource Development
While MABE's first two moments of truth revolved around obviously weighty issues with
highly visible immediate consequ nces, the third, by way of contrast, brings to mind the clue of
the barking dog in the Sherlock Holmes story.  The clue was that the dog did not bark.  In a like
manner, this third moment of truth in the history of MABE was marked by its lack of claim to
immediate attention; yet it had great significance that can be properly asessed only in retrospect.
In 1986, in the context of the ongoing management changes in Mexico City and the inten-
sive joint-venture negotiations with General Electric, it became evident to MABE's top
management that the preceding strategic pattern - under which every corporate unit formulated
and implemented its own strategy in a largely independent manner with only limited input from the
top - had reached a point of diminishing effectiveness.  Accordingly, it was decided that a new
function of strategic coordination between divisions needed to be created.
This was the point at which the dog did not bark.  With no fuss and fanfare, the
strategic coordination function was placed under the authority of Juan Diego Oliva,
MABE's Corporate Director of Human Resources.
Evaluation of the linkage between strategic coordination and human resource
development.
 This simple, seemingly routine decision showed both remarkable insight a foresight.
Its insight lay in the recognition that in a newly industrializing country, continuous upgrad-
ing of the quality of the company's human resources is the indispensable precondition of domestic
industrial leadership and international competitiveness.  In such a situation, it is unrealistic to for-
mulate corporate strategy without a focus on where the company's human-resource capabilities
currently stand and to what level they might be raised within the strategic horizon.  Bridging the
cultural gap that typically separates the human resourc  and strategic coordination functions and
placing them under the same corporate executive greatly increases the likelihood that the two
functions will be considered in their mutual interrelationship.
While emphasizing the key importance of this decision, it must also be noted that MABE's
strategic coordination function, embeded in the Mexican cultural context, is by no means identi-
cal to the strategic planning function as understood in the U.S.  In the same way as there has
never been an intent to spell out precisely the division of authority and responsibilities between
MABE's three top corporate decision-makers, leaving mutual adjustments to be handled by indi-
rection on the basis of personal relationships, there has never been an intent to define a precise
division of authority and responsibilities between Juan Diego Oliva in his capacity as Director of
Strategic Coordination, and the Directors of substantive areas.xxxvi  In this case as in the former
one, mutual adjustments have been left to be handled by indirection on the basis of personal rela-
tionships.
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In practice over the years Oliva, whose leadership style is in any event highly nondirective,
has left most substantive strategic issues except human resource development to be handled in a
decentralized fashion.  Yet, he has interfaced with the strategic process of each substantive area
to the extent that acquisitions, technical restructuring, joint ventures, or geographical expansion
have had important human resource implications - as they of course invariably did.  Since as
Director of Strategic Coordinat on he has been and continues to be responsible for seeing to it
that no base in the entire corporate strategic process is left uncovered, he has in fact used the
human resource development function to create key links that help to hold together the entire
strategic process.
The foresight of the decision lay in its anticipation of the recognition now emerging that the
acquisition and deployment of core competencies, emphatically includi g their human-resource
components, is the central strategic task of top management in modern corporations aspiring to
global market leadership; and that busines  firms cannot remain competitive anywhere in the
world without a commitment to the conti uous buildup and proper architectural interrelation
between these core competencies.
What enabled MABE to take such a progressive decision - and do so before significant
exposure to GE's advanced business philosophies?  A push from the past was the implicit
recognition, in connection with the management troubles in Mexico City over the preceding years,
that human resource concerns were crucial in governing the strategic options and fate of the orga-
nization.  A simultaneous pull from the future was the emergence of a real possibility for a joint
venture with General Electric which at this point was in its final stages of negotiation, and with it,
the challenge that if MABE was not to lose control of its own destiny to key GE managers, the
company needed to put human resource and especially managerial development at the center of
its strategic concerns.
Perhaps the most important factor was the persistent transcultural orientation of key per-
sons within the company - an orientation passed down from the founding generation to the young-
er generation.  This orientation created a context for MABE's key decisions that enabled them to
transcend the narrowness of a single national culture at a time when most firms, not only in Mexi-
co but also in the United States, were still enmeshed in the parochiality of their own cultures.
Looking outward from Mexico to the international business environment made it clear that MABE's
aspirations in export development and the pursuit of international joint ventures hinged on a
strategy in which human resource development played a central role; it was thus logical to link
together closely the strategic and human-resource functions.
Before leaving the current discussion, it is important to point out the strong interrelations
that existed between the three moments of truth that have been pres ted so far.  They coincided
closely in time, over the three-year period 1984-1987.  The structural changes they wrought were
complementary and mutualy reinforcing.  Jointly, they initiated the metaorphosis of a reason-
ably well-run but traditional firm with its share of tradiional problems in 1984, into to-day's full-
fledged, rapidly expanding transnational enterprise.
Fourth Moment of Truth: Creation of a State-of-the-Art Plant for Export to GE's Markets in
the U.S.
The challenge of designing, building, and successfully operating MABE's new, million-
units-per-year gas range plant in San Luis Potosi, which was at the center of the MABE-GE joint
venture agreement, led to MABE's fourth moment of truth.
The Best-Practice Case of MABE-GE WP 96-12
Page 35
Under the joint venture agreement, the Mexican side retain d management responsibility
for all aspects of the operations of the expanded MABE organization.  Final responsibility for
making the project work thus in principle rested with Mexican management.  Nevertheless, it was
obvious that GE in effect had to lead the plant design and construction effort; moreover, Mexican
managers were keenly aware that they could not afford to make any significant mistakes on the
project without risking a major revision of the agreement.  In practice they thus not only had to
take day-to-day direction from their GE counterparts but were also under pressure to be very fast
and very effective learners.
GE assigned a 30-member team to the project which worked closely with MABE's
Mexican project team.  While no GE technicians or executives ever moved from GE Appliance
headquarters in Louisville, Kentucky, to San Luis Potosi to buy a house and take on long-term
technical or executive functions, twenty people from GE did rent housing in San Luis Potosi and
technicians were in and out all the time.
The gas range to be produced in the new plant was designed in Louisville, KY, embodying
GE's long experience of producing electric ranges for the U.S. market.  MABE's Mexican side con-
tributed product and manufacturing know-how specifically pertaining to gas ranges.  The design
and building of the new plant was a major challenge for both MABE and GE.  MABE had never
taken on a construction project of comparable scope and complexity; GE on its part, had not
previously designed and manufactured gas ranges for sale in the U.S. market.  It is noteworthy
that the gas range produced at the new plant was destine  from the start for the high end of the
line both in the American and Mexican markets; it was, for example, designed with self-cleaning
features.
To realize its goals, the joint project posed a categorical imperative for highly intelligent,
flexible, and dedicated cooperation across a gulf of both national and corporate cult res.  That it
succeeded is a major tribute to both partners.
The joint project team.  Jaime Dupuis and Luis Berrondo selected Urbano Pérez for the
challenge of heading up the project and leading the Mexican side of the joint MABE-GE design,
construction, and start-up team.  They left it to Pérez and the team to find ways of meeting the
chalenge - a crucial instance of modern ondirective leadership whose wisdom has been amply
confirmed by the outstanding success of the project.  Pérez's background was in engineering and
administration; he had worked his way up in the compressor plants in Mexico City and San Luis
Potosi and was heading the latter plant when he was tapped for the big job.  He was thirty-three
years old at the time; Luis Berrondo himself was only a few years older.
Pérez entered the scene after the joint venture agreement had been completed and a
modest amount of preparatory work had been initiated.  Th  GE side of the start-up team was
headed by Ed Gibbon who jointly with Bob Reid had been negotiating for GE.  Gibbon had earlier
lived in Brazil for years; other GE memb rs of the start-up team had also had international expo-
sure, including Jim Boswell who had worked in Korea.  At the beginning of the implementation
phase, the MABE side of the team had six to seven full-time members.  Of the thirty or so men
and women on the GE side of team, four to five were assigned full-time, with an additional fifteen
to twenty assigned part time in Louisville.
The cross-cultural genius of the team was in its age composition.  By Luis Berrondo's ac-
count, he had asked General Electric to designate team members preferably in their late forties
and early fifties; MABE in turn named a team with a mean age of twenty-eight.  Berrondo had
strongly felt that such a pronounced age difference on the two sides was going to be essential for
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the sucess of the team.  Without it, Mexican team members would have considered it personally
demeaning to be accepting guidance and mentoring from other professional  their own age, espe-
cially foreigners.  Berrondo judged, however, that the emphasis of Mexican culture on strong emo-
tional bonds within the family, creating an attiude of natural respect and def rence by sons to
fathers, would come to the fore as a result of the age difference and would ensure that MABE
team members absorbed the knowledge, skills, and attitudes of the GE side in the most effective
manner.  This did, in fact, happen.xxxvii
Moreover, an evolutionary process occurred which gradually re-tuned the inter-
generational emoti nal overtones in the direction of sibling relationships - as shown by a shift in
responsibilities.  In Pérez's opinion, a key to the success of the team was a clear division of these
responsibilities at all times, with the MABE side in charge of the planning of production, materials,
human resources, training, and systems; and the GE side initially in charge of the U.S. marketing
plan, product design, and quality control.  After production was started, however, over the years
the responsibility for all quality control and most of product design was gradually passed to the
MABE side.
Challenges of the project leader.  The question of quality control, about which GE had
some initial doubts, leads directly to what Pérez regarded as his most crucial initial chalenge:
gaining immediate credibility n front of the GE side for himself and his people.  This required high
levels of professionalism, but that was not enough.
Even within the father-son emotional context, which worked admirably to facilitate
communications within the start-up team, the cultural gap separating the two sides
remained to be bridged.
An anecdote recounted to Mauricio Brehm of the Pan American Management Institute
illustrates the point.  Pérez noted that in cross-cultural teamwork, the small details were the ones
that required special attention.  He recalled that when he and his Mexican teammates visited the
U.S. to meet with their GE counterparts, at lunchtime they were being served sandwiches and soft
drinks that had been ordered in.  They were put out by this because they felt that they were not
being treated with proper respect.  When the GE team members came to visit in Mexico, lunch
was aranged at a good restaurant, taking up as much as two hours.  It was now the turn of the
GE people to be put out because they considered that such a long interruption of the work
showed a lack of serious commitment.xxxviii  These were the kinds of cultural traits that team mem-
bers on the two sides had to recognize and acept; they had to bring into the open, analyze, and
resolve many small sources of bad feelings that revolved around culturally fixed work and
personal customs before the team could become fully effectiv .
Pérez formulated his second challenge as bringing in both the plant and the product on
schedule, up to quality standrds, and on target as to cost.  In recalling the early heroic days of
the project, he emphasized that it was an advantage to be able to design both the product and the
plant at the same time, because this offered the opportunity for efficiencies of careful coordination
- but it also made for a much more complex task.  He perceived GE, the prospective recipient of
most of the plant's output, as an extremely demanding client, but he stated in retrosp ct that he
regarded this as an advantage because it spurred him and his team members to their very best
efforts.  He was also aware that his management of the project had to meet GE's standr s if
Mexican management responsibility for the whole expanded MABE operation, stipulated in the
joint-venture agreement, was not to be called into question.
This was going to be a state-of-the-art plant.  Pérez knew that it could in fact be built with
the talented engineering group and the ample financial resources that he had at his dispo al.  Yet,
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it raised what Pérez regarded as his third challenge: doing it right the first time.  Meeting this chal-
lenge compelled him to understand the difference between the First World and the Third World.
"My workers have to commute every day between the First World and the Third World, and have
had to do so from the start," he stated - the trenchant quote that had been selected to introduce
the present study. "Training, training, and training," he continued. "The real thing was for these
workers to understand attitudes ... complejísimo - an extremely complex matter."  They also re-
quired knowledge, "easy," and skills, "a little b  more involved."
Long-term benefits of meeting the human-resource challenge-term benefits of
meeting the human-resource challenge-term benefits of meeting the human-resource
challenge-term benefits of meeting the human-resource challenge-term benefits of meeting
the human-resource challenge-term benefits of meeting the human-resource challenge.
What MABE has accomplished and is continuing to do so in the area of training is indeed
extraordinary.  Pérez stated that his workforce spends 5 to 8 percent of working hours in training
or quality-team meetings, that is, some 100-160 hours per year; this compares to 40 hours per
year at Motorola, one of the highest in the U.S.  At San Luis Potosi, the training process started
even before workers were hired into a formal perman nt status; individuals selected for a pre-
contracting stage were given a governm nt fellowship for a training course.  Additional workers
were being hired progressively over a fairly long period of time as first the pilot line, and later three
additional production lines started up one after another.  Theplant was designed for a total
complement of 1100 worke s and 600 employees.
The investment of an extraordinarily high proportion f paid labor hours in training as well
as participation in teams systematically pursuing continual improvements, was a key factor in
MABE's success in coming up to internationally competitiv  levels from the start of operations at
the San Luis Potosi plant.  Sustaining this investment over the years allowed MABE to stay in the
competitive lead and together with other world-class companies in the global industry, to keep
pushing pioneering standards forward.  Such an ongoi  investment in human capital has a very
high financial return because it keeps the respective firms a jump ahead of the competition by
enabling them to exploit cost-reducing and product-enhancing innovations as soon as they
become available.  Thus it continually upgrades and expands their core competencies and en-
sures them sustained profitable access to ever-changing broad markets.
This is true for companies in industrially advanced economies; it is doubly true for compa-
nies such as MABE that are able to come up to leading performance levels while operating in
Third World regions where wage levels are substantially lower.  The financial benefits ar
therefore correspondingly greater.  At the same time, as Pérez has pointed out, coming up to the
international leading edge in Mexico does not imply matching U.S. productivities.  Optimizing the
process at lower wage rates generally implies somewhat higher labor intensiies; in the San Luis
Potosi plant one can observe some manual operations that might be mechanized but under
optimal conditions should not be.  This means that productivity improvements have not been
pursued blindly for their own sake.  Yet, as Luis Berrondo Jr. emphasized, MABE has never
withheld capital investments when these could contribute to improving international
competitiveness - with full GE concurrence in this powerful long-range vision.
Management training proceeded in parallel with worker training.  Apart from the extremely
intensive de facto on-the-job training the key management members assigned to the joint MABE-
GE project team received during the years of design, construction, and start-up of the new plant,
other Mexican management members were also assigned to work in Louisville, Kentucky, for long
periods of time, in order to absorb GE's management philosophy and practical skills.
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During these years, under the leadership of Jack Welch, GE was embarking on a major
effort of its own to change its corporate culture, with new tools being developed for putting the
change into effect.  MABE benefit d greatly from being exposed to these new initiatives.  MABE
personnel was, for example, included in the Work Outxxxix sessions of GE Appliances in Louisville,
alone among that organization's joint venture partn rs.  MABE was also fortunate in that GE Appli-
ances in 1990 pioneered within GE a new set of practices named Quick Response that allowed
manufacturing operations to become much more flexible.  "Quick Response, the result of a Best
Practice from an outside company, has made Appliance Park the hottest destination on GE's
internal Best Practices circuit."xl  MABE personnel was thus able to witness the developm nt of a
major culture change initiative within GE at its point of origin within that organization.  MABE per-
sonnel was, moreover, also asigned to attend one, two, and four-week intensive training courses
at GE's management education center at Crotonville, NY, on a par with GE executives.  This prac-
tice continues to the present; Pérez states that executives in his management team participate in
a training project of their own choosing once a year.
It was emphasized by the persons interviewed for this report, both from the MABE and the
GE sides, that the success of the cooperative arrangements between the two companies owed
very much to the personal abilities of Bob Reid.  He has been described as a very kind person,
easy to get along with; a person with whom Mexicans felt very comfortable and with whom they
could easily identify.  This enabled him to undertake the shuttle diplomacy - in his own words, "like
Henry Kissinger" - that kept the peace between the top levels of the two organizati ns.  Luckily for
the project, he stayed in place at GE Appliances in Kentucky over the entire span of years to the
present during which his functioning as a corporate diplomat, catalyst, facilitator, and spokesman
for "the hidden team of believers" has been critical for the success of the joint venture.
Evaluating the fourth moment of truth and its human resources sequel.  The design,
construction, and start-up of the San Luis Potosi plant was the make-or-break test of initial
cooperation between MABE and GE.  It represented a major challenge under MABE's strategic
intent of structural change, fast growth, and interational competitiven ss.  The noteworthy
features of coping with this challenge can be summarized as follows:
 The challenge was posed directly by MABE's CEO to the Mexican side of the joint
MABE-GE team, allowing the personnel involved to find its own solutions without
micro-management from the top.  This is fully in accord with the principles involved
in the concept of strategic intent.
 The Mexican project leader counted it as a benefit to have a highly exigent client in
GE, because it ensured best effort and promised great returns in competitiveness -
very much in keeping with Porter's principle of pursuing dynamic rather than static
advantages.xli
 The bridging of the cultural gap between the Third World and the First World was
central to the project's focus from the very beginning, as was the bridging of the
cultural gap between GE and MABE.  These tasks were undertaken by a massive
transfer of training, skills, and new tools emerging from GE's own fast evolving,
modern corporate culture to MABE at all levels.  They succeeded without compro-
mising the Mexican side's sense of cultural identity because MABE retained control
over the process throughout its entire course.
 Underlying the successful bridging of the above two gaps was the integration be-
tween corporate strategy and human-resource management, jointly targeted at
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attaining and maintaining international competitiveness.  This integration and the
resulting high levels of performance safeguarded MABE's continuing management
authority.
 Ongoing team learning and the underlying disciplines advocated by Sengexlii had
been built into the culture of the evolving organization at San Luis Potosi from the
very beginning.
The start-up of production at the new plant in 1990 coincided approximately with the end
of the period of major acquisitions and expansion of MABE that ushered in their own problems -
and thereby carried MABE towards its fifth moment of truth.
Fifth Moment of Truth: Integration of Mexican Acquisitions into a Unified Corporate Culture
MABE's fifth moment of truth revolved around the challenge of moving the greatly
expanded MABE organization, following the signing of the GE joint venture agree-
ment and various acquisitions, toward a unified, modern corporate culture.
Meeting this challenge was, indeed, inispensable for international competitive-
ness whose attainment and maintenance, together with structural change and fast
growth, represented MABE's strategic intent.
Given the mixture of traditional management styles within the acquired components and
MABE's own rapid transformation, there were many ways in which the unwieldy conglomerate
arising out of these consolidat ons could have gone off the tracks.   Yet, the moment of truth
brought on by the acquisitions was adressed with the same style and panache as the previous
ones.
By 1989, the expanded MABE organization consisted of the original major production
facilities of MABE in Mexico City and Queretaro; GE Appliances Mexico merged into MABE by the
joint venture in 1987; the applince business, mainly gas ranges and refrigerators, of IEM-West-
inghouse; and the appliance business, mainly washing machines, acquired from the GE-GIS
(Grupo Industrial Saltillo) joint venture in 1989.  These acquisitions were important in their own
right because they increased the size of MABE and gave it a complete line of major appliances;
they were even more important because they put MABE to the test: could it integrate the initial
congomerate assemblage into a high-powered, modern organization?  Accomplishing this task
was the precondition for parlaying MABE's privileged access to the U.S. export market into
powerful transational operations.
Primary responsibility for meeting this challenge, including crucial tasks of planning and
facilitation, was on the shoulders of Juan Diego Oliva, MABE's chief officer in charge of human re-
sources and strategic coordination.  In discharging this responsibility successfully he had the full
backing of Luis Berrondo Jr.
Oliva recognized from the start that forcibly imposing MABE's own rapidly modernizing
management style on the acquired units would have been a sure way to disaster.  If this had been
attempted, resistances to change would have been hightened by the sense of loss of
organizational identity in the acquired units and with it, a sense of threat to the personal identiies
of the key people involved at all levels.
What Oliva decided, instead, was to proceed on the model of team learning under ondi-
rective leadership.  He organized a cycle of intensive management meetings of top executives
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who needed to make important decisions.  Directors from all units participated.  The cycle ran for
four months with meetings of two half-days per week, Thursday afternoons and Saturday
mornings, and also involved special assignments that participants were asked to tackle outside of
meeting hours.  All management issues were discussed; differences between the way they were
being handled in different units were compared; and their advantages and disadvantages were
being threshed out.
Ideas and sugestions for change were contributed from every sid .  There was no expec-
tation that all change was going to take place in the acquired units; many of the agreed-on ways
to coordinate corporate cultures also required changes within MABE's original units.  This made it
much easier for the managers in the acquired units to go along with agreements calling for signifi-
cant changes in their own management styles and corporate practices.  Moreover, since all
participants contributed to the all-around agreed changes, they were able to identify with the pro-
cess of change and the agreements hammered out; they were motivated to put the latter into
practice.
The process of consolidating a company-wide, uniform manageent style and corporate
culture that was initiated with great success by the joint four-month management seminar could
not be expected to end there.  A decisive step had been taken, but results w re not
instantaneous.  Indeed, the seminar was the beginnin  of an ongoing effort that involved the
development, testing, implementation, and refinement of a series of human-resource training
courses and seminars with a standardized set of manuals and other training materials used
company-wide, together with other instruments of integration and consolidation.  Many of the
advanced practices were taken over from General Electric whose own rapidly evolving corporate
culture in the late Eighties and throught the Nineties exerted a major influence in bringing
MABE's corporate culture and management practices into the very forefront of international
business developments.
Among the instruments of integration and consolidation, computerized systems played an
important role in implementing the concept of free information flows, moving in the direction of
GE's concept of an organization without boundaries.  An early move toward this concept was in
practice brought down to the grass-roots level with the start-up of operati ns at San Luis Potosi in
1990 where 110 computer terminals, dispersed throughout the manufacturing areas, could be
accessed by all personnel atached to the new plant complex.xliii
The effort aiming at a seamless integration of all of MABE's components still has some
way to go even to-day, especially because after 1993 the extent and complexity of the task has
acquired a new dimension as MABE has gone transnational by expanding into South America.
THE MODERN TRANSNATIONAL COMPANY
Sixth Moment of Truth: Transnational Expansion into South America
As MABE, in its association with GE, successfully conquered and held an important share
of the gas range and refrigerator markets in the United States, and as it was rapidly attaining all-
around international competitiveness by absorbing and spreading GE's advanced management
techniques throughout the entire company, it upgraded its aspirations.  From 1992 on, Luis
Berrondo Jr. contemplated expansio  into South America.
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Technological basis of transnational operations.  No company can become a truly
transnational power from a position of technological dependency.  From this point of view, 1993
was a seminal year as MABE opened a new technology development center in Queretaro and
concentrated all of its res arch and development functions and personnel into this facility, thereby
gaining a decis ve measure of technological autonomy in the major appliance industry.  The initial
objective of Luis Hoyos, the Center's director, has been to come up to international res arch and
development standards in products and manufacturing, leaving b sic scientific research for a later
stage.  The Center has a number of advanced developm nt projects, the most immediately impor-
tant of which concerns practical manufact ring problems involved in the use of a new family of
halogenated refrigerants that elimnate up to 90% of the harmful environmental effects of the cur-
rently used chloro-fluoro compounds.
MABE was now ready to raise its sights and redefine its stra egic intent from
achieving international competitiveness to achieving primacy in major appliances
throughout the broader Latin American region comprising the Andean countries of
South America.
Expansion into South America and the issue of its sharing of the expansion with
GE.  In September and December, 1993, Luis Berrondo closed two consecutive joint-venture
deals in South America.  In Venezuela, he acquired 49% of Menaca, SA, a manufacturer of
washing machines and gas ranges.  Menaca was acquired from SETECO, a firm based in the
Netherlands whose South American operations were being run, according to Berrondo's account,
by "Latinized Dutchmen."  Berrondo parlayed the friendly relations he developed with these
SETECO executives in the course of negotiating the Venezuelan deal, into an inside-track
approach to Phillips of the Netherlands, from whom he acquired a 51% share of Polarix Electrodo-
mésticos, SA, a manufacturer of refrigerators in Colombia.  This latter deal pre-empted Whirlpool
with whom Philips had close associations in other countries; it also included the option of buying
the remaini g half of Polarix.
Berrondo undertook these transnational joint ventures even though at that point General
Electric had decided not to go along with this South American xpansion.  Thus the deals and
financial transactions were concluded not on behalf of MABE but on behalf of the investors on the
Mexican side of the MABE-GE joint venture, in the name of EXIN, a legally independent entity -
but in effect, with a MABE management contract.  The current arangement is that EXIN's
transnational ventures pay a royalty to MABE that entitles them to the use of MABE designs and
production technologies, together with short MABE executive visits of less than one week
duration.  More extensive techni al and management services rendered by MABE are being ac-
counted for by specifi , itemized additional charges.
There can be no doubt that MABE's Mexican management is strongly identified with the
Menaca, Polarix, and later transnational acquisitions of EXIN, and with the subsequent diffusion of
MABE's corporate culture into South America.  As Berrondo put it, "We love Genral Electric but
we are MABE."  MABE's sense of corporate identity is in substance if not in legal form, with or
without GE, involved in the South American expansion.
Berrondo has, nevertheless, given GE the option of buying into the South American
venture; at the same time he has also set out to persuad  GE to make MABE its appliance arm
throughout Latin America.  Though GE in fact owns a substantial competing interest in Venezuela
and though each country in South America possesses appliance industries, the continent as a
whole may be considered as wide open for penetration by a world class operation combing the
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cultural, marketing, and regional manufacturing competecies of MABE with the vast technical
capabilities, advanced corporate culture, and brand recogniti n of General Electric.
In 1994 Richard Stonesifer, the top executive in charge of GE Appliances, tentatively de-
cided to go along with Berrondo and to make MABE his point organization for penetrating appli-
ance markets in the entire Latin American region.  There are, however, indications of resistance in
GE to ceding this crucial role to a joint venture that, with GE's 48% equity share, is not under GE
control.  Another consideration from GE's point of view is the SEC rule that precludes GE from
reporting the rapidly growing profits from its minority share in MABE as a part of GE's own profits.
If GE owned a half share or more, these profits would benefit GE's own performance figures.
Final arangements concerning Berrondo's option offer and the future sharing of expan-
sion into the South American appliance market between MABE and GE, with consideration of the
above and other related issues, have been under negotiation as of January, 1996.
MABE's standing with GE is, in any event, very strong.  Not only is the company consid-
ered GE's best joint venture partner in appliances world-wide, but MABE is being increasingly
relied upon as a source of advice and human resourc training for GE's overseas appliance
operations outside of Latin America.  Thus the original mentoring relationship, in which all training
and skill transfer moved from GE to MABE, has by now turned into more of a two-way relationship
in which MABE has much to offer GE in terms training human resources and making joint
ventures succeed in a transcultural context.
MABE's transnational momentum.  The degree to which MABE has become a true
transnational is attested by the ease with which it has shrugged off the near-disaster that the
Mexican economy has gone through during the past year.  Not only has MABE made up in
exports most of what it has lost in domestic sales; in the middle of the Mexican macroeconomic
calamity in 1995 it has possessed both the self-confidence and the resources to continue its
aggressive expansion into Central and South America.xliv  It cquired a two-thirds share in DUREX
S.A., an ap liance manufacturing operation in Ecuador; purchased rights to the respected "Cen-
trales" brand in Colombia; set up distribution organizations in Guatemala and Costa Rica; began
expansion into Peru; and prepared the ground for a venture in Brazil whose specific arrangements
are now being negotiated with GE.
Luis Berrondo Jr., who has a special interest and experience in creating new joint
ventures, has indicated that in all the ventur s mentioned above, a key consideration has been
the purchase of existing markets.  He considers that production plant associated with a given
potential venture may or may not be worth taking over in whole or in part.  MABE clearly aims at
either establishing world-class production facilities at existing locations, or else transferring
product from world-class facilities at other locations.  MABE is now integrating regional manu-
facturing operations by means of the exchange of parts and components between its three part-
ners in Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador, thereby greatly reducing costs and minimizing the
need for extra-regional imports.  MABE is also heavily engaged in transfusing its modern man-
agement culture into all South American ventures, including intensive human resource training.
The next subsection will present a brief summary of how a truly well-run transnational
operation can turn even some aspects of a major economic contraction in its home market into a
source of long-term strength.
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Seventh Moment of Truth: Holding Course through Mexico's National Economic Crisis
This last moment of truth has much in common with the second one discussed earlier;
once again, we encounter Sherlock Holmes' clue of the dog that did not bark.  In the midst of the
national storm, MABE showed scarcely a flutter.  The moment of truth passed so quietly that its
significance comes to the fore only upon close consideration of the question: what made it
possible for an important corporation in Mexico to be so untouched by the major national
macroeconomic crisis?
This moment of truth requires only a brief review, because most of the elements that make
up its setting have already been recounted when MABE was introduced in the early sections of
this report.
The key situational element was the national macroeconomic crisis following the collapse
of the Mexican peso in December, 1994.  In the course of this crisis, the national market for major
appliances contracted by some 26 percent.  MABE's domestic sales, because of its quality dvan-
tage and marketing strength, fell only by 21 percent (Exhibit 1).
MABE's export markets were not affected by what happened in Mexico; the rapid expan-
sion of sales in these markets continued from the prec ding years into 1995.  In terms of physical
units produced (not in terms of the devalued peso which would produce a spurious jump) exports
increased over 15 percent in 1995 compared with 1994.  Exports to the U.S. for marketing by GE
represented the major part of this export growth, simply because they were so massive.  Yet, in
terms of growth rate from a small base, exports to Latin America were spectacularly, exceeding a
200 percent growth rate.  Exports took up the slack in MABE's Mexican domestic market to such
an extent that the total number of units sold by MABE during between 1994 and the crisis year of
1995 fell by less than six percent.
As a result of the devaluation of the peso, MABE's cost of imported components in its
Mexican manufacturing operations more than doubled overnight.  What is most impressive is the
speed and dispatch with which MABE responded to this shock; it makes apparent the outstanding
quality of management that explains MABE's long-term performance - as well as the reason why
the dog did not bark when the roof fell in.
In response to the devaluation of early December, MABE at GE's suggestion put up within
three months, by March, 1995, a major two-day commercial fair in a Mexico City hotel for Mexican
national supliers.  Imported parts and components were laid out on exhibition tables; national
producers were encouraged to submit bids for supplying them, to replace imports that had be-
come much too expensive.
The fair was extremely well attended, because Mexican suppliers of the automobile indus-
try and other metal transforming industries had seen demand for their products contract precipit-
ously with the crisis of the national economy, and were only too happy to submit bids to a potential
customer who could take up the slack in their productive capacities.  The end result was that
MABE succeeded in creaming the national supply.  So many attractive bids w re received that the
company was in a position to give preferenc  to supliers that were geographically close to
MABE's respective production locations.  In all, MABE not only succeeded in avoiding a major
jump in part and component costs, but ended up with high-quality, low-cost, geographically well-
located supply sources.  In addition, through its support of natio l producers during the slump,
MABE also derived a major dynamic benefit, both by expanding its local supply base and by culti-
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vating relationships of intensive technical and organizational interaction that in the future could
very well lead to the expansion and upgrading of MABE's own core competencies.
MABE is increasing its penetration in the U.S. market; it is rapidly increasing its exports to
Latin America; it is now involved in appliance production, through a royalty and management con-
tract mediated by EXIN, in three South American countries; and it has its sights set on the whole
continent.  In the inauspicious context of a poorly managed national economy, it offers a truly
instructive example of Best Practice in Third-World corporate cultural change that provides many
pointers for corporations bent on emulating its transn tional and transcultural successes.
CONCLUSIONS
The preceding sections of this study presented the major decision points - "moments of
truth" - that led to the MABE-GE joint venture's emergence as an autonomous transnational enter-
prise in its own right.  This section spells out some conclusions to be drawn from this experience.
The most important conclusion is that an exceptional ability to relate across
cultural barriers in the course of this joint venture, both on the side of MABE and
that of GE, was a crucial determinant of success.
 On MABE's side there had been an exceptional transcultural orientation ever since
the firm's founding that MABE has consciously cultivated throughout its history,
both before and after the alliance with GE.
This conclusion is supported by the cultural background of the founding families, the inter-
national ties of the second generation, the hiring of bicultural top personnel, and a series of epi-
sodes of MABE's creative interaction with GE during the entire course of the joint venture, includ-
ing the three-year negotiating process that led up to it.
 On GE's side, the critical transcultural element was the corporation's willingness
and commitment to transfer to MABE advanced technology, advanced
management practices, and key elements of GE's pioneering corporate culture that
has been in rapid evolution since the Eighties.
GE played an exemplary mentoring role throughout.  It selected a manager, Bob Reid, to
interface with MABE who was highly suited to cultivating personal relationships across cultural
barriers, and left him to continue in this function throughout, up to the present.  GE al o assigned
highly competent individuals to joint technical teams, invited MABE personnel to work in its own
facilities over extended periods, opened the doors of its technical and executive training programs
to MABE personnel, and even included MABE - alone among the joint ventures of GE Appliances
- in some of its own rough-and-tumble "Work-Out" sessions.
As a result, MABE was able to absorb the most progressive elements of the technical and
management culture of its partner and mentor, General Electric.  Given the exemplary executive
decisions by both partners, MABE was at all times also able to maintain its autonomy, its Mexican
management, its strong Mexican identity, and its transcultural perspective.  Today MABE is in a
position, on the basis of this perspective, to make reciprocal contributions to GE not only in fast-
growing profits but also in helping to expand GE's global core competencies by sharing critical
skills required for the successful penetration of South American appliance markets.
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What are other specific insights arising from the seven moments of truth of MABE's corpo-
rate history, all but one of which involved the joint venture with GE?  What else does this history
tell us about joint ventures, about transnational operations in general, about human-resource and
core-competenecy development?
In looking over what can be learned from the MABE-GE experience, the focus will be on
joint ventures.  Yet, many of the conclusions also apply to transnational operations in general.
This holds especially for conclusions that involve the transcultural aspects of human-resource and
core-competence development, as they prominently do in the case of the MABE-GE experience.
The transcultural insights turn out to be significant even when national cultures are similar, as in
the case of countries such as Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador th t share a common
language.  Indeed, these considerations undoubtedly apply within countries that have significant
cultural differences between regions, such as Canada, South Africa, India, and many others.
In appraising joint ventures, it is convenient to emphasize the differing points of view of the
more and the less advanced partner.  Two partners may of course form an alliance on the basis of
approximate equality, yet even so, one partner may often be more advanced in some respects,
the other partner in others, coloring their points of view.
Choice of Joint-Venture Partners
The GE-MABE case provides three separate experiences in this regard from which
conclusions can be drawn.  First, GE was seeking a partner to provide a low-cost foreign source
of supply for its emerging gas-range business in the U.S. - a market in which it had not been
traditionally presnt and which it began penetrating only recently.  Mexico was the preferred
location for such a source of supply.  GE also wanted help from the prospective partner for
gaining a dominant position in the growing Mexican major- ppliance market.  Second, MABE was
seeking an international partner to open up export possibilities to foreign markets and to provide
additional capital resources as well as access to advanced technology and management
methods.  Finally, after the joint venture with GE was already in full operation, MABE was seeking
new joint venture partners to help it in the penetration of South American markets; at this point
MABE was in a position to transfer advanced technology and management practices to its
prospective South American partne s.
In GE's choice of MABE, the leading position of MABE in the Mexican appliance market
and its good management within the Mexican context were decisive criteria.  It is, however, not
clear to what extent GE at the time appreciated MABE's transcultural orientation that was to prove
crucial in the effective absorption of technical and management know-how from GE.  Without the
latter, MABE's success in meeting highest U.S. quality and cost standards would not have been
possible - and yet, this know-how received from GE proved to be the foundation of all later suc-
cesses of the joint venture.
 An important pointer from the MABE-GE case for international corporations is the
importance for them to appraise the extent of transcultural orientation of their pro-
spective joint-venture partners.  The latter orientation offers a clue to the ease with
which these partners are likely to absorb transfers of advanced know-how and
corporate culture, which in turn is essential if such ventures are to attain and hold
on to international competitiveness.
MABE in choosing GE gained immediate access to a large U.S. market and a partner of
eminent international stature.  An important clue to GE's probable quality as a mentor firm that
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MABE possessed at the time was the quality of interaction with the individuals assigned by GE to
the joint-venture negotiations over a period of three years.  One of these was the manager later
assigned to interfacing with MABE who had an outstanding ability to relate across cultural
barriers.  MABE did not know, however, how the quality of this one individual would translate into
GE's overall mentoring relationship to MABE.  From this point of view, it was important that MABE
was able to negotiate successfully to retain management control and a majority of the equity of
the joint venture, thereby safeguarding its autonomy.
 The useful insight for dynamic firms hoping to break out of the confinement of
domestic markets is that they should evaluate the probable willingness and ability
of potential international partners to engage in effective mentoring across cultural
barriers.  Retaining management control and a majority of the equity of the joint
venture, if possible, will obligate the more advanced partner to advise and
persuade, should policy disagreements ever arise, rather than issue heavy-handed
instructions.
MABE's choice of South American partners hinged almost entirely on their established
position in the respective markets in Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador.  The acquisition of
productive capabilities and facilities played either a minor role or, in one case, none at all, as
many existing facilities were antiquated and slated for replacement.  MABE as the more advanced
partner in these alliances was able to offer its prospective partners the transfer of know-how that it
had absorbed from GE, including world-class product designs, technically superior production
methods, and modern management practices and support.
 A noteworthy feature of MABE's South American expansion strategy is that MABE
has chosen to enter these markets through joint ventures rather than
independently.  This raises an important consideration for international corpora-
tions that aim to penetrate emerging markets.  If a highly successful firm such as
MABE, despite its long history of transcultural orientation and obvious ease of
functioning in a Latin setting, prefers joint ventures to independent operation, then
there is all the more reason for firms with a less transcultural mind-set and greater
cultural barriers to overcome, to learn how to choose the right partners and pursue
transnational joint ventures successfully.  In entering emerging markets it may
often be indispensable in to rely on joint ventures or, at the very least, to have bi-
cultural individuals in key executive roles.
Creation of Flexible Cross-Cultural Teams
MABE had in the past created such teams jointly with General Electric; it is now extending
its experience with joint teams into its South American operations.  The successful functioning of
these teams has required, as a base line, high professionali m, nondirective leadership, the team
learning disciplines, and team members with transcultural backgrounds.  Yet these were by them-
selves not enough.  The first MABE-GE project team had to deal with clashing, culturally fixed
expectations revolving around personal and work habits.  This has provided the study with an im-
portant insight:
 Team members had to have the self-confidence as well as the introspective and
inter-personal skills to bring sources of culturally based discomfort and resentment
into the open, in order to recognize, accept, and resolve these among themselves.
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 In this situation in which significant one-way transfer of knowledge, skills, and
attitudes was desired, a delibrately arranged difference of half a generation be-
tween the ages of the GE and MABE sides has contributed greatly to the ease of
mentoring and the effective functio ing of the team.  This aspect of the experience
may in all likelihood be generalized to other similar situations.
The same is not necessarily true for the entire experience of the MABE-GE project team.
The recounted history the team conveys the impression that its members were in many ways ex-
ceptional and that the generalization of their experinc  cannot be taken for granted.  Indeed,
there are indications in the business literature (in a context completely apart from c ss-cultural
issues) that significant difficulties may be exp cted in this area.  Functioning effectively on a
cross-cultural team involves an unusual learning experience that at times inevitably elicits reac-
tions of frustration and personal inadequacy.  Yet, the individuals assigned to such high-profile
teams are likely to be fast-track professionals who have been almost always successful at what
they did and rarely experienced setbacks; thus they have typically never learned how to learn
from failure.  The typical result, as discu sed in a seminal article entitled "Teaching Smart People
How to Learn,"xlv is for such individuals to deny their own role in any difficulties and to blame
instead everybody and everything in sight.  The way around this trap is designated as  "double
loop learning."  It requires team members to subject their own professional performance to the
same standards of rational analysis that they habitually apply to technical problem solving tasks
and then to use this analysis to upgrade their own performance - an entirely new and different
kind of learni g that does not come easily.
Learning Across Cultural Boundaries
The MABE-GE experience suggests that joint project teams, frequent movement of foreign
specialists in and out of specific local tasks, the assignment of managers from MABE for long peri-
ods of on-the-job learning with GE, and attendance of MABE managers at formal training courses
of GE's Crotonville center all played essential roles in the success achieved.  Beyond this, there is
a strong indication that MABE's own corporate culture that had previously been reoriented toward
learning, teamwork, and the shedding of authoritarian relationships may have played a m jor role
in the ability of its personnel to absorb from GE knowledge, skills, and attitudes rooted in an ad-
vanced, knowledge-centered management philosophy.
MABE has also had significant experience with learning across boundaries of corporate
culture where the objective has been creation of an integrated larger organization. MABE's experi-
ence suggests that the key to success has been non-directive leadership of a high quality that
facilitated comitment from all sides to developing a shared culture.
 In the coming together of multip e partners, even when one is in nominal command
- as MABE has been in relation to its various acquisitions - no one partner can
impose its business culture on the joint effort without risking failure because of
massive organizational resistance.  Asking one partner to emulate another is likely
to be perceived as a threat to organizational and even personal identity.
 It is important to recognize that within different cultures, the same objective might
be best served by different means.  In the U.S., a clear division of authority and
responsibilities is regarded as basic to efficient decisionmaking.  Yet, the history of
MABE provides instances where d cisionmaking has been very effectively shared
by indirection, on the basis of typically Latin personal relationships, with neither a
clearcut division of authority and responsibilities, nor a desire for one.  Such a
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situation existed for years between the three top individuals within MABE; it has
also long existed between the directors of substantive areasxlvi nd the director in
charge of strategic coordination.  Similar differences are found not only between
national cultures but also between corporate cultures within the same country.
 Success in drawing together multiple partners into a unified organization requires,
as in the case of MABE's consolidation of its Mexican acquisitions, that the
partners joining together should be given the opportunity to take the best of each of
their cultures, combine it with the latest in management thinking, and crete a
shared culture that reflects both current needs and the many-sided heritage of the
combined venture.  It also appears essential to stress the need for a freer informa-
tion flows and organizational flexibility - that is, asking all sides to give, includi g
the nominally dominant side.  This may provide the best framework for bridging the
cultural gaps and integrating all relevant processes and decis on flows.
Facilitation of Multi-Cultural Change Processes
MABE has blended diverse corporate cultures within Mexico and has successfully bridged
the Anglo-Latin cultural gap.  In recent years, MABE and GE have been successfully coordinating
the evolution of a pioneering cultural change process that is unfolding within both corporations.
MABE is now in the process of involving its South American partners in the same multi-cultural
change processes.
Several conclusions can be drawn from these exp riences.
 The first precondition for success in multicultural change processes is visible sup-
port and leadership from the top.  In the case of GE the impetus of the drive during
recent years for changing the corporation's culture has at all times been coming
directly from Jack Welch; in the case of MABE, the continual upgrading of corpo-
rate culture has had the full commitment and backing of Luis Berrondo.
 A second precondition most likely is commitment to a shared corporate culture by
all units participating in the multicultural change process.  This implies that all units
must be willing to change.  The key insights arising from MABE's experience in
consolidating the corporate cultures of its various acquired units in Mexico,
mentioned above, apply directly to MABE's efforts of transmitting its own advanced
knowledge-based management culture to it South American partners.
 A third precondition appears to be a shared strategic intent or, in the case of coop-
erating autonomous units, compatible strategic intentions.  The latter situation ex-
ists today between MABE and General Electric.  GE is undergoing a major
corporate culture change with the intent of maintaining the growth rate and leading
global position in its core businesses.  While MABE directly interacts with only one
of GE's thirteen core businesses, it shares with GE key aspects of GE's culture
change.  This serves MABE's strategic intent of leadership in the appliance mar-
kets throughout Latin America.
In addition, the instruments for implementing multi-cultural change processes have to be at
hand.  Both in the interactions of GE and MABE and those of MABE and its South American part-
ners, a broad group of such instruments has been available as a result of earlier expe iences of
the principals. The respective instruments include joint cross-cultural project teams; exchanges of
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technical specialists for short-term assignments; and mentoring relationships that transmit
knowledge, skills, and attitudes from the mentoring firm to the mentored firm by means of training
manuals, special training courses, on-the-job training for extended periods, or participation in
formal traing that the mentoring organization makes available to its own personnel.
Development of Strategic Alliance Networks
MABE's experience, both with GE as the more advanced partner and with its new, less
advanced South American partners, suggests that for the success of a prospective alliance or
joint venture, it is essential for both sides to lead from strength.  Outstanding global firms such as
GE seek out strong and respected joint-venur  partner organizations that are perceived to be
capable of transcending the limitations of their national cultures - such as MABE had been in
Mexico in the early Eighties.  Conversely, when strong firms that are respected in their local mar-
kets wish to break out of the confines of their national environments and seek to dev lop broader
associations, they can confidently aproach top-quality international corporations as prospective
partners.
When MABE currently intends to enter a new markets in South America, it seeks to estab-
lish ties with local firms that have strong, respected brands and good reputes in their own
markets.  MABE then initiates the alliance from this baseline, by upgrading the core competencies
and corporate management practices of its new partners.  Moreover, MABE strives to integrate
these core competencies not only with those of its own but also regionally among its partners.
Thus MABE, in the course of modernizing the production technologies of its new partners in the
Northern region of South America, is designing the new facilities for a mutual interchange of parts
and components within the region.  This greatly increases the scale of particular operations and
creates an integrated regional complex with higher productivities and lower costs than would be
possible for self-contained national operations.  In this way MABE builds up a formidable interna-
tional competitive advant ge.
It is noteworthy that the excellent mentoring that MABE has received from GE is precisely
what MABE is now passing on to its South American partners as its is building a network of alli-
ances spaning two continents.  MABE is currently in negotiations with GE about how to share
emerging initiatives in South America.  This shows that MABE has developed to the point where
its relationship to GE has to be re-tuned to reflect MABE's increasing capabilities.
The original MABE-GE joint venture is now on the point of expanding into a network of
alliances that promise a great increase in benefits to both MABE and to GE as the two partners
readjust their relationship on a more equal basis.  This development provides an important
consideration for transnational corporations in similar situations:
 A successful mentoring relationship has striking commonalities with a good father-
son relationship.  As the mentoring firm transfers its culture and experience while
nurturing its partner's autonomy, identity, and initiative, the partner firm grows into
a relationship where it has more and more of its own particular competencies to
contribute to benefit its erstwhile mentor.
 In this way the network of alliances has the potential of broadening more and more
as mentored firms successively grow up to initiate mentoring relationships of their
own.
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The latter process certainly does not offer the only dynamic that works to expand networks
of alliances.  None the less, this may turn out to be an important mechanism whereby
technological and organizational excellence is being transferred to emerging markets, providing
them with genuinely enhanced productive capabilities.  If so, this network expansion process
would help reduce the gap that separates the Third World from the industrially advanced
economies.
EPILOGUE: TRAINING THE EXECUTIVE OF THE FUTURE
Effective management of transnational joint ventures requires understanding of two major
trends, both of which are rooted in our globalizing information economy.  Businesses are becom-
ing ever more knowledge-centered; and businesses find themselves thrust into ever more
transcultural environments.  The MABE-GE joint venture is a best-practice case that offers
important insights for coping successfully with both of these trends.  By the same token, it raises
the question: how should human-resource development be managed to produce executives ready
to meet this knowledge-centered and transcultural, brave new business world?
A fascinating intimation about possible answers is offered by the observation that there
exists a latent convergence, though not yet a manifest meeting, between two sets of managerial
skills.  The first includes those that will be in increasing demand as GE's internal culture change
progresses and similar changes occur in other firms (as partly attested, partly postulated by the
recent business literature).  The second comprises the ones that have been found essential in the
present study for productive interactions across cultural barriers in transnational joint ventures.
The common denominator of the two converging sets of managerial skills is given by the
capability of relating across qualitative differences rather than similaritie ; practice in developing
interactions on a footing of mutuality rather than hierarchy; orientation toward working across
barriers of national, corporate, and functional/professional cultures; and experience with what
Argyris calls "double-loop" learning.  In sum, the attitudes, skills, and capabilities that arise from a
mature personality, as against the somewhat adolescent, self-centered drive of the typical execu-
tive on the fast track.
 In the process of GE's internal culture change, these skills translate into the
efficient nondirective leadership demanded by a flattened organizational pyramid;
into the flexible decisiveness needed for handling the challenge of Work Outs with
dispatch; into the openness required for finding and adapting Bes  Practices; and
into the all-around non-hierarchical interactions and crossing of cultural watersheds
required for moving toward the Boundary-less organization.
 In the process of interactions across transnational cultural barriers, the same skills
translate into competent and respectful mentoring; into the open and committed
absorption of the transfers of technical and managerial know-how; into effective
joint teams; and into the kind of cross-cultural organizational lear ing in joint ven-
tures that becomes more and more reciprocal as the less advanced partner moves
toward international standards of excellence.
To the extent that these insights are valid, the challenge for the development of human
resources is twofold: coming up with effici nt executive training methods focused on the critical
common-denominator skills; and putting in place incentive systems throughout the organizations
involved that will reward managers who practice these skills effectively.
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QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
This Annex presents a set of questions suitable for classoom or seminar discussion when
the study is being used for instructional purposes.
The questions refer, in part, to the materials included in the study and serve to focus atten-
tion on key points discussed in the chapters above.  Yet, in part, the questions aim to go beyond
what is covered in the study itself and attempt to explore several kinds of related issues where no
"correct" answers exist, such as:
 Precisely what meaning should be assigned to general concepts (cultural differenc-
es, human resource development) that have been used in the study without
detailed explanation?
 Do the contributions that have been selected from recent business literature to
represent the conception of a modern corporate culture, do so fairly?  Are any
major ideas missing?
 Do the findings and conclusions of the study appear to be well supported, or is
there reason to take exception to them from this or that point of view?
 To what extent can the observations, insights, and findings of the study b  general-
ized to other similar business situations?
 Does the study permit anticipation of likely future developments in the transcultural
functioning of businesses?
The questions have been organized by the three phases of MABE's history that are dis-
cussed in separate major sections of the text, beginning with Evolution of MABE's Latent
Potential.  An additional set of questions concerns the study as a whole as well its conclusions.
No questions have been developed specifically to cover the Executive Summary, Introduction,
Background, and Conceptual Framework; yet the materials included in these sections are
represented by questions dispersed among the four groups of questions below.
Questions Concerning the Evolution
of MABE's Latent Potential
• What is the difference between traditional Mexican and modern management styles, as
given in the study?  Is this distinction persuasive?  Should it be changed?  If so, how?
• Does the conception of a traditional management style generaliz  from Mexico to other
countries?  Which?  In what way?
• What indicates MABE's transcultural orientation from the founding of the enterprise on-
ward?  Can businesses founded by immigrants be generally expected to show an above-
average transcultural orientation?  Can such an orientation, if present, help a modest-
sized, local business?  If so, how?
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• What was the relationship, in MABE's case, between the company's management style
and transcultural orientation?  Can we expect more readiness to transition from a
traditional to a modern management style in the case of a company with a pronounced
transcultural orientation?  If so, why?  Does this apply to MABE's case?
• Some of the benefits of the transcultural orientation of MABE's founding families did not
appear until the second generation had come into its own in the business.  Can we expect
that the respective benefits will provide a general motivation for a transnational orientation
over such a long time horizon?  Were there shorter-term benefits in the case of MABE?
What were they?  Do they generalize to other cass?
• In MABE's case, how was the corporate top decisionmaking process affected by the rela-
tionship between the founders and hired managers?  Did MABE derive a competitive
advantage from hired top management?  How?
• What were the factors that gave MABE an advantage over other appliance manufacturers
in weathering the difficult years following 1976, especially the crisis years 1982-84?  What
helped MABE in turning around an unhealthy union-management relationship in its Mexico
City plant that was far from unusual in Mexican industry?  What role did personalities play
in this process?
• In the Mexican cultural context, in what way can personal interactions in decisionmaking
substitute for a clearcut definition of authority and responsibilities of the interacting xecu-
tives?  How has such a process worked in MABE at the top decisionmaking level?  Is this
personal-interaction mechanism necessarily inferior to the generally accepted U.S. and
international approach to organizing the executive decisionmaking process?  What advan-
tages might it have?  Under what business and/or cultural conditions?  Does it provide a
paradigm that might be worth emulating elsewhere under certain conditions?
• What were the key considerations involved in the decision of whether to sell MABE or to
commit it to fast growth by means of an alliance with a transnational partner?  What role
did the personal-interaction process at the top play in this decision?
• How did MABE's business strategy evolve into a clearcut strategic intent prior to the alli-
ance with GE?  What was the first major challenge under this strategic intent?
• What are the key ideas embodied in the "strategic intent" concept in the literature?  What
is the relationship between a stable, decades-long strategic intent and short-term challeng-
es?  What is the role of mobilization of the organizatio 's resources?  What kind of a man-
agement style does it imply?
Questions concerning Establishment of the MABE-GE Partnership
• What made GE Appliances look for a foreign partner?  Why in Mexico?
• What made MABE attractive to GE?  In general, what should a major transnational firm be
looking for in selecting a partne ?
• What other options were available to GE?  On what basis did GE decide?
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• What made GE attractive to MABE?  What other options did MABE explore?  In general,
what criteria should a dynamic Third World c mpany apply in looking for a transnational
partner?
• What role did personalities play in the negotiation process that shaped the joint venture
agreement?  What were the respective roles of general considerations versus personali-
ties, on both sides, in working toward a final commitment to the joint venture?
• Why was it an important challenge for MABE to link closely its corporate strategy with
human resource development during the long period of joint-venture negotiations, in
preparation for the impending changes to be introduced by the joint venture?  By what
mechanism was the linkage between the two functions achieved?  In what way did the
decision to undertake this linkage show both exceptional insight and foresight?
• What enabled MABE to take this decision and implement it successfully?  Did MABE's
transcultural orientation play a role in this regard?  If so, what role?
• How did the linkage of the two functions work out in pract ce?  In what way did personal
interactions in decisionmaking substitute for a clearcut definition of the respective authority
and responsibilities of the divisional directors and the director in charge of strategic coordi-
nation and human-resource development?  What instrumental role did the human-
resource development function play in achieving company-wide strategic coordination?
• What were the key features of the joint venture agreement?  Is the allocation of 52% of the
equity and with it, management authority to the Mexican side of the joint venture, a viable
paradigm for other joint ventures?  What were the consequences of this core feature of the
agreement for MABE's success?
• After the creation of the joint venture with GE, in what way did MABE's strategic intent hold
constant?  In what way was the construction of the new gas range plant at San Luis Potosi
the major new challenge under MABE's strategic intent?  Why was it a challenge for GE?
In what way was it a challenge in terms of the first MABE-GE collaboration?
• On what principles was the joint MABE-GE project team organized that had to design,
construct, and start up the new plant?  What was the arrangement that made it easier for
Mexican team members to accept the transfer of technological and management know-
how without feeling that their personal and national identities were under pressure?
• What were the three key challenges as perceived by the project leader on the Mexican
side?  How was a Third World labor force brought to the point of performing at interna-
tional technical and economic standards?  What was the role of labor training?  Of
"continuous improvement" teams?  Why did performance even to this day not rise to U.S.
productivity levels?  Is this a target for further improvements, or is it a pattern to be
emulated in other Third World production processes?
• Why was a clearcut division of responsibilities between the U.S. and Mexican sides of the
joint team not only accepted but even desired by the Mexican project leader in this case?
What was the division of responsibilities?  How did it evolve over time?
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• In what ways were the mutual cultural expectations of U.S. and Mexican team members
incongruent at the start of joint work?  What was an example of this incongruity?  What
made it possible to work out satisfactorily the initially clashing expectations?  What role did
the transcultural orientation of MABE's top management play in this process?  Was the
earlier transition of MABE from a traditional authoritarian to a more modern management
structure a factor in the success of this process?  What role did personalities on the GE
side play in the process?
• Other than joint teams, what other arrangements were used to promote the transfer of GE
corporate culture and management techniques to MABE?  In what ways did GE maintain a
successful "mentoring" relationship with MABE?  What was the essenc  of this relation-
ship?  What are the characteristics of an appropriate mentoring attitude?
• In meeting the second major challenge arising after conclusion of the joint venture, what
process did MABE use to begin integrating the diverse corporate cultures of the several
appliance manufacturers it acquired?  How was resistance from the acquired companies
minimized?
• What were the attitudes on the part of MABE management that made the above process
successful?  To what extent did these attitudes reflect a transfer of corporate culture from
GE, and to what extent were they ome-grown?  In what way did MABE's transcultural
orientation and transition to a modern management culture help in this process?  Can the
strategy used for achieving the integration of diverse corporate cultures be generalized?
• What role did personalities play in the successful progress of the above integration
process?
• What were the key elements of the culture change that GE itself was undergoing while it
was interacting with MABE?  Did MABE benefit from GE's own culture change over the
years?
Questions Concerning the Modern Transnational Company
• What were the crucial elements of technological culture that MABE had to absorb from GE
before it was ready for an autonomous transnational role?  What were the crucial elements
of managerial culture?  What were the preconditions of this successful culture transfer
from the MABE side?  From the GE side?
• What factor in MABE's transcultural orientation, from its founding on, played an important
role in the South American expansion?  What does this say about the time horizon of
operation of a transcultural orientation?
• On what considerations has MABE been choosing its South American partners?
• In what ways has MABE been transmitting transmitting to its South American partners the
advanced technological and management culture it has absorbed from GE?
• What considerations might have motivated GE to withhold participation in the South
American expansion?
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• What device has been used to give MABE a key role in this expansion without committing
GE's 48% equity share in MABE to the expansion?  What option has GE been offered with
regard to future equity participation?
• What does this situation say about latent or potential tensions in the MABE-GE
relationship?
• Was MABE's extraordinarily successful absorption of GE's technical and managerial
culture, to the point of making MABE an autonomous transnational player in its own right,
a factor diminishing, or contrariwise increasing, latent or potential tensions?  What does
this say about the long-term development of successful mentoring relationships in gener-
al?
• Despite the above potential or latent tensions, what is the overwhelmingly positive side of
the MABE-GE relationship?  Having absorbed much of GE's advanced corporate culture
without losing its Latin identity, what benefits can MABE now convey to GE?  Is there a
significant promise of qualitative benefits over and above the 48% share in MABE's rapidly
expanding profits?  What reverse transfer of MABE's own corporate culture to GE may be
attractive from GE's point of view?
• How might the above reverse transfer of corporate culture influence the negotiations be-
tween MABE and GE (not concluded when the present study was closed), concerning
GE's option to join MABE's Mexican investors in the existing South American ventures?
How might it influence the negotiations concerning further expansion into South America,
especially into Brazil?
• What continuing quantitative and qualitative benefits does MABE derive from its
relationship to GE?
• In particular, how did its relationship to GE help MABE weather the current Mexican eco-
nomic crisis?  What role did MABE's exports for GE marketing in the U.S. play in stabi-
lizing its economic performance?  Over and above that, what helpful strategic suggestion
did MABE receive from GE for coping with the crisis?
• How much weight should be assigned to MABE's U.S. exports for GE marketing, and to
MABE's absorption of GE corporate culture, respectively, in MABE's ability to ride out the
current Mexican economic crisis successfully?  How much weight should be assigned to
the South American expansion?  Are all of these factors interrelated?  How?
• Is import substitution, as practiced by MABE during the crisis, a valid approach to joint
venture development in general?  Under what conditions should it be considered as a seri-
ous option?  Under what conditions should it be avoided?
Questions concerning the Study as a Whole and its Conclusions
• Do "moments of truth" or critical decision points constitute adequate markers for reviewing
corporate history?  Are the ones chosen for MABE appropriate?  Are there too many?
How could MABE's history be broken into periods in a more insightful way?
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• Is transfer of a modern technological culture a precondition of the success of a joint ven-
ture?  What are the essential characteristics of a modern technological culture?
• Is transfer of a modern management culture a precondition of the success of a joint ven-
ture?  What are the essential characteristics of a modern management culture?
• Have the key aspects of a leading-edge international manageent culture, summarized in
the Conceptual Framework section of this study, been appropriately chosen?  Are a y
core ideas missing?  Can any of the aspects included in the summary be attacked as not
being valid or as being marginal?  Is this evaluation meant to apply primarily to the MABE-
GE case or is it meant to be general?
• Is a modern technological culture closely interrelated with a modern management culture?
Does the concept of "core competencies" adequately capture the essence of this interrela-
tion? Should anything be added?
• What is a transcultural orientation?  What are cultural "gaps" or "barriers"?  How are these
encountered in relation to management styles?  In what other ways do they manifest
themselves in joint ventures?
• What was transferred to MABE from GE's management culture?  How was MABE able to
absorb this transfer of culture without losing its corporate and national identity?  What
made it possible on MABE's side?  On GE's side?  Can the factors and principles involved
in the MABE-GE case be generalized to other situations?
• What are the key considerations for a leading transnational firm in looking for a joint ven-
ture partner?  For a dynamic Third World firm?  For two firms on a level of approximate
equality with respect to advancement toward the leading edge of international business
practices?
• What attitudes or skills are desirable in members of a cross-cultural team?  How can such
attitudes and skills be cultivated?  What is the role of an appropriate scheme of incentives
in motivating the development of appropriate attitudes and skills?
• How important have personalities been in the MABE-GE case?  How important have they
been on the side of MABE?  Of GE?
• How important is support and involvement from the top for success in culture transfer
projects?  How important is commitment to the development of a shared culture?  Why?
• How persuasive is the proposition that alliance networks may grow out of chains of men-
toring relationships over time?  What is the process whereby this might happen?  What are
its strengths and weaknesses?
• What is "double loop learning"?  Why is it an essential skill for members of cross-cultural
teams?  Why does it come hard to corporate executives on the fast track?
• How persuasive is the proposition advanced in the Epilogue that there exists a latent con-
vergence between managerial skills that will be in increasing demand as the internal
culture change of leading corporations progresses, and the ones that have been found es-
sential in the present study for managing transnational joint ventures?
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• Do the major insights gained and conclusions drawn from the MABE-GE joint venture
generalize to foreign subsidiaries of transnational corporations?  Do they generalize to
alliances between corporations at comparable levels of development with respect to
leading international standards?
The Best-Practice Case of MABE-GE WP 96-12
Page 61
EXHIBIT 1
MABE PERFORMANCE DURING THE CURRENT
CRISIS IN MEXICO
(000 UNITS)
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EXHIBIT 2
MABE MARKET SHARE IN THE DOMESTIC MARKET
FOR MAJOR APPLIANCES IN MEXICO
(000 units)
GAS REFRIGER WASHING TOTAL
RANGES ATORS MACHINES INDUSTRY
1990 876 803 914 2593
1991 969 988 1095 3052
1992 1013 1040 1093 3146
1993 840 999 1079 2918
1994 942 1201 1200 3343
1995 762 816 780 2358
MABE
1990 360 430 550 1340
1991 439 482 577 1498
1992 481 478 609 1568
1993 414 468 550 1432
1994 434 581 608 1623
1995 375 470 429 1274
MABE PERCENT
1990 41 54 60 52
1991 45 49 53 49
1992 47 46 56 50
1993 49 47 51 49
1994 46 48 51 49
1995 49 57 54 54
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  EX H I B I T  3
     M A B E  E M P L O Y M EN T  1 9 5 3 -1 9 9 5
   G A S  R A N G ES   R E F R I G E R A T O R S     C O M PO N E N T S  W A SH I N G  M A C H I N ES        O  T  H  E  R         T  O  T  A  L                  M issin g
O p e r . E m p l . T o t a l O p e r . E m p l . T o t a l O p e r . E m p l . T o t a l O p e r . E m p l . T o t a l O p e r . E m p l . T o t a l O p e r . E m p l . T o t a l E m p l .
1 9 5 3    N A    N A    N A    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    N A    N A    N A    -
1 9 5 8    N A    N A    N A    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    N A    N A    N A    -
1 9 6 3    N A    N A    N A    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    N A    N A    N A    -
1 9 6 8    N A    N A    N A    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    N A    N A    N A    -
1 9 7 3    N A    N A    N A    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    N A    N A    N A    -
1 9 7 8    N A    N A 1 7 5 0 3 4 9 1 4 5 4 9 4    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    - 3 4 9 3 6 4 5 3 9 9 4 1 7 5 0
1 9 8 0    N A    N A 1 6 0 0 4 0 8 2 2 7 6 3 5    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    - 4 0 8 3 4 2 7 3 8 3 5 1 6 0 0
1 9 8 1    N A    N A 1 6 0 9 4 3 1 2 6 7 6 9 8    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    - 4 3 1 3 4 8 5 3 9 1 6 1 6 0 9
1 9 8 2    N A    N A 1 6 3 6 3 2 7 2 0 8 5 3 5    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    - 3 2 7 3 4 8 0 3 8 0 7 1 6 3 6
1 9 8 3    N A    N A 1 5 3 4 3 4 0 2 2 0 5 6 0    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    - 3 4 0 3 2 8 8 3 6 2 8 1 5 3 4
1 9 8 4    N A    N A 1 1 6 0 2 4 1 1 7 5 4 1 6    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    - 2 4 1 2 4 9 5 2 7 3 6 1 1 6 0
1 9 8 5    N A    N A 1 2 0 3 4 2 2 2 1 9 6 4 1    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    - 4 2 2 2 6 2 5 3 0 4 7 1 2 0 3
1 9 8 6    N A    N A 1 5 5 6 4 8 1 2 5 0 7 3 1    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    - 4 8 1 3 3 6 2 3 8 4 3 1 5 5 6
1 9 8 7    N A    N A 1 5 9 0 7 4 4 3 4 8 1 0 9 2    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    - 7 4 4 3 5 2 8 4 2 7 2 1 5 9 0
1 9 8 8    N A    N A 1 9 0 5 1 2 0 8 5 6 8 1 7 7 6    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    - 1 2 0 8 4 3 7 8 5 5 8 6 1 9 0 5
1 9 8 9 0 1 9 3 0 1 9 3 0 1 3 8 0 6 6 0 2 0 4 0 7 1 1 2 8 0 9 9 0 2 0 7 7 6 0 1 2 6 7 8 3 4 2 4 7 7 8 1 9 4 5 1 0 5 8 7 8 1 0 3 8 7 1 9 3 0
1 9 9 0 8 8 3 2 4 2 8 3 3 1 1 1 4 9 2 7 3 7 2 2 2 9 7 1 0 2 8 0 9 9 0 2 2 9 4 5 7 0 2 8 6 4 3 6 8 5 9 3 9 6 1 5 7 4 7 7 4 0 1 1 3 1 4 8 2 7 9 3
1 9 9 1 1 3 4 1 2 1 7 1 3 5 1 2 1 4 9 6 7 2 3 2 2 1 9 7 0 5 3 2 0 1 0 2 5 2 2 1 9 5 3 9 2 7 5 8 3 6 6 6 1 6 9 8 2 6 1 2 7 7 3 1 2 1 3 4 3 9 2 9 4 3
1 9 9 2 1 2 1 4 1 7 7 5 2 9 8 9 1 8 3 3 7 7 8 2 6 1 1 7 3 0 3 1 3 1 0 4 3 2 0 1 1 5 6 5 2 5 7 6 3 0 1 7 2 9 1 0 3 0 6 0 8 9 6 6 0 2 1 2 6 9 1 2 4 4 2
1 9 9 3 1 1 8 1 1 4 7 5 2 6 5 6 1 7 7 8 6 5 8 2 4 3 6 6 0 4 2 3 1 8 3 5 1 4 6 6 4 4 1 1 9 0 7 3 8 9 6 9 7 1 0 8 6 5 4 1 8 5 6 2 7 1 1 0 4 5 2 1 2 5
1 9 9 4 1 2 7 5 1 3 3 3 2 6 0 8 2 1 1 9 8 3 5 2 9 5 4 8 0 3 2 5 5 1 0 5 8 1 5 3 9 3 5 6 1 8 9 5 4 1 2 7 4 2 1 1 5 4 6 1 4 8 5 5 8 6 1 1 7 3 4 2 0 6 5
1 9 9 5 2 2 1 2 7 6 6 2 9 7 8 2 2 2 3 6 9 9 2 9 2 2 7 8 2 2 7 3 1 0 5 5 1 2 9 8 2 9 2 1 5 9 0 3 1 3 1 1 9 4 1 5 0 7 6 8 2 8 3 2 2 4 1 0 0 5 2 0
N O T E :  T h e  su m  o f  e m p l o y e e  su b t o t a l s f a l l s  s h o r t  o f  t h e  t o t a l s  g i ven .
T h i s r e m a i n s t o  b e  r e c o n c i l e d .
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EXHIBIT 4
MABE DOMESTIC SALES 1953-1995
    GAS RANGES   REFRIGERATORS  WASHING MACHINES       TOTAL
K units M N$ K units M N$ K units M N$ K units M N$
1953 NA NA       -       -       -       - NA NA
1958 NA NA       -       -       -       - NA NA
1963 NA NA       -       -       -       - NA NA
1968 NA NA       -       -       -       - NA NA
1973 NA 0.3       -       -       -       - NA NA
1978 NA 0.9 NA NA       -       - NA NA
1980 NA 1.5 NA NA       -       - NA NA
1981 NA 1.5 NA NA       -       - NA NA
1982 NA 2.3 NA NA       -       - NA NA
1983 NA 4 NA NA       -       - NA NA
1984 NA 5 NA NA       -       - NA NA
1985 NA 8 NA NA       -       - NA NA
1986 NA 17 NA NA       -       - NA NA
1987 NA 51 NA NA       -       - NA NA
1988 NA 105 NA NA       -       - NA NA
1989 NA 136 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1990 360 170 430 NA 550 NA 1340 NA
1991 439 168 482 NA 577 NA 1498 NA
1992 481 152 478 NA 609 NA 1568 NA
1993 414 157 468 NA 550 NA 1432 NA
1994 435 160 581 NA 608 NA 1624 NA
393 NA 453 NA 490 NA 1336 NA
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EXHIBIT 5
MABE EXPORTS 1974-95
(000 units)
GAS REFRIGER WASHING TOTAL
RANGES ATORS MACHINES
1974 7          -          - 7
1975 13          -          - 13
1976 24          -          - 24
1977 23 1          - 24
1978 23 13          - 36
1979 25 38          - 63
1980 17 40          - 57
1981 14 19          - 33
1982 6 21          - 27
1983 10 33          - 43
1984 17 34          - 51
1985 17 26          - 43
1986 26 40          - 66
1987 36 48          - 84
1988 45 37          - 82
1989 32 84 4 120
1990 109 133 5 247
1991 431 188 8 627
1992 681 239 12 932
1993 705 290 12 1007
1994 821 310 16 1147
1995 929 393 23 1339
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EXHIBIT 6
Mabe Wholly Owned Subsidiaries and Producing Plants in Mexico
SUBSIDIARY PRODUCTS/LOCATION PRODUCTION
CAPACITY
(000 Units per year)
BRANDS
MABESA, S.A.DE C.V. (Holding) Holding company for All Subsidiaries
Ensambladora de Refrigeradores,
S.A. de C.V. (ENRESA)
Refrigerators/Mexico City 384 MABE, GE, IEM,
KELVINATOR, EASY
Industrias, ASTRAL, S.A. de C.V. Refrigerators/Queretaro 1,150 MABE, GE, IEM, EASY,
KELVINATOR, DUREX,
REGINA, POLARIX,
HOTPOINT
MABE-SANYO compressors, S.A.
de C.V.
Compressors/San Luis Potosi 700
Productos Troquelados y de
Alambre, S.A. de C.V. (PROTAL)
Plastic Model Components, and
Stamped and Wire Parts/Queretaro
*
Industrias MABE, S.A. de C.V.
(IMASA)
20” Gas Ranges/Mexico City 480 MABE, GE, EXCEL,
KELVINATOR, IEM, DUREX,
REGINA
LEISER, S.A. de C.V. 30” Gas Ranges/San Luis Potosi 1,000 MABE, GE, IEM, KENMORE
Industrias CONFAD, S.A. de C.V. Washing Machines/Monterrey
Fractional Electric Motors/Monterrey
Alluminium Injection/Saltillo
Machining/Saltillo
750
1,200
*
*
IEM, EASY, MABE, GE,
KELVINATOR, CINSA.
GE, POWER ELECTRIC
Tecnologia y Desarrollo Technology and Development
Center/Queretaro
Distribuidora CONSUL, S.A. de C.V. Materials, Sales and Distribution/All of
Mexico
Servicios Integrados Fabriles, S.A.
de C.V. (S.I.F.)
Customer Service /All of Mexico SERVIPLUS
*All Captive
The Best-Practice Case of MABE-GE WP 96-12
Page 67
EXHIBIT 7
Location of MABE Producing Plants
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Exhibit 8
MABE Organization Chart
Overview
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Exhibit 8A
MABE Organization Chart
Detail A
President
Managing Director
Gas Ranges Director
Refrigeration
 Director
Mexico
City
Plant
Manager
Queretaro
Plant
Manager
MABE Sanyo
Compressors
Plant Manager
Columbia
Plant
Manager
Mexico
City
Plant
Manager
San Luis
Potosi
Operation
Manager (2)
Venezuela
Plant
Manager
Ecuador
Plant
Manager
Stamped &
Wired Parts
Plant
Manager
Washing
Machines
 Director
Monterrey
Washing Mach.
Plant
Manager
Saltillo
Plant
Manager
Fractional
Electr. Motors
Plant
Manager
Plastic
Components
Plant
Manager
Manufacture
Manger
Enamel
Manager
Ensamble
Manager
Maquinado
Operation
Manager
Aluminium
Injection
Operation
Manager
The Best-Practice Case of MABE-GE WP 96-12
Page 70
Exhibit 8B
MABE Organization Chart
Detail B
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Exhibit 8C
MABE Organization Chart
Detail C
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Exhibit 8D
MABE Organization Chart
Detail D
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EXHIBIT 9:
MILESTONES IN THE MAJOR APPLIANCE
INDUSTRY IN MEXICO, 1940'S TO PRESENT
1940’s Firms in the refrigerator industry: General Electric; Industria Electrica de Mexico (IEM-Westing-
house); Frigidaire (General Motors); Kelvinator.
1947 MABE is founded.  Competing firms around this time in the gas range industry are: Acros; Delher.
1950 Firms in the washing machine industry: Troqueles y Esmaltes; Hoover Mexicana; Cinsa.
1964-Dec **Diaz Ordaz presidency begins.
1964 MABE enters the refrigerators market.
1970-Dec **Echeverria presidency begins.
1970 MABE produces the first refrigerator with polyurethane foam insulation in Mexico.
1960's-70's The major appliance industry consolidates with 8 firms: Aceros Esmaltados; Troqueles y Esmaltes;
MABE; IEM-Westinghouse; General Electric; Hoover; Cinsa; Corporacion Industrial Mexicana.  By
the 70’s Aceros Esmaltados builds a plant (Erna) in Celaya, Guanajuato.  Washing machines are
produced by Hoover, Cinsa, Corporacion Industrial Mexicana (Easy), General Electric, and Crolls.
1976-Dec **Lopez Portillo presidency begins.
1978 MABE's new refrigerator plant in Queretaro begins production.
1980’s Vitro acquires Troqueles y Esmaltes, Aceros Esmaltados, Erna, and Manufacturera Corpomex.
Vitro closes plants of Troqueles y Esmaltes and Aceros Esmaltados.  Manufacturera Corpomex
ceases production prior to acquisition. Vitro builds a new plant (Supermatic) and acquires Crolls
Comercial, a washing machine manufacturer, thus completing its product lines in appliances.
1982-Dec **De la Madrid presidency begins.
1983-84 Debt crisis; inflation; currency devaluation.
Drastic market contraction: 30-40%.  Price controls; subsidies to failing firms; Government acquires
35% of major appliance capacity.
1985 Economic opening to international market begins.  Deregulation; price decontrol.  Sales of
government-owned firms.  Start of major foreign investments in Mexican industry.
1987 MABE and GE enter into a joint venture agreement; GE Appliances Mexico is merged into MABE.
MABE acquires the appliance business of the IEM Company.
1988 First national industry-labor pact; maximum tariff rate reduced to 20%.
1988-Dec **Salinas presidency begins.
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EXHIBIT 9 (CONTINUED)
1989 Economic reform continues with accelerated liberalization of economy.  Commercial treaties;
inflation control; expansion of fiscal base.  Sustained economic growth.  Power of labor unions
reduced.
MABE acquires the appliance business of GIS (Grupo Industrial Saltillo), completing its business
lines with washing machines.  This acquisition consolidates MABE's position with a 50 percent
market share of the Mexican major appliance industry.
1990 New MABE gas range plant in San Luis Potosi begins production serving domestic and export
markets.
1990’s Vitro opens a new plant for appliances in Monterrey and enters into a joint venture with Whirlpool.
1992 Free trade agreement with Chile signed.
1993 NAFTA trade agreement signed with U.S. and Canada.
1993 MABE opens its Technology and Development Center and goes transnational with Venezuela,
Colombia joint ventures.
1994 Chiapas crisis.  Colosio assessination.  Major fall in foreign exchange reserves.
1994-Dec **Zedillo presidency begins.  Collapse of peso signals national economic crisis.
1995-96 U.S. loan guarantee agreement prevents economic collapse.  Economic and financial crisis
bottoms out.  Slow improvement begins.
Democratization; political opening to all parties.
1996 Current structure of major appliance industry:
Gas ranges: MABE (Mexico City, San Luis Potosi); Vitro (Monterrey)
Refrigerators: MABE (Queretaro, Mexico City); Vitro (Monterrey)
 Washing Machines: MABE (Monterrey, Saltillo); Vitro (Monterrey); Cinsa (Saltillo)
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EXHIBIT 10:
MABE MILESTONES, 1947-1996
YEAR EVOLUTION OF MABE CORPORATE CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP MANAGEMENT FOCUS
1947 MABE is founded in Mexico City by Mavardi and  Berrondo
families.  Product: kitchen cabinets.
Company has transcultural orientation from the start.
Traditional management style.
1955 MABE produces its first gas range.
1964 MABE produces its first refrigerator.
1970 MABE produces the first refrigerator with polyurethane foam
insulation in Mexico.
1974 MABE becomes industry leader as first gas range exporter.
1976 First MABE decentralization project: refrigeration operation
moved out of Mexico City. Period of management conflict with a series
1978 MABE starts production at a new refrigerator plant in
Queretaro; main product line: one-door refrigerators; capacity:
450,000 units.
of different unions at Mexico City plant; conflict does not
extend to plants outside capital.  Resolution of the long conflict
1983 Major industry crisis begins. ends traditional "solar" management approach.
1984 Generational change in top management group. Union crisis resolved with transition to new corporate culture
focused on people and quality.
1985 Exit or grow? Competition weakened. Negotiations begin with
GE and Whirlpool.
n First moment of truth: Commitment to growth with leading
transnational partner.
1986-87 n GE negotiations concluded: MABE-GE 52:48. MABE
acquires the appliance business of IEM-Westinghou e -
mainly gas ranges and refrigerators.
n Strategic planning introduced.
n Second moment of truth: GE agreement signed.
n Third moment of truth: Strategic coordination a d human
resource development linked.
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EXHIBIT 10 (CONTINUED)
YEAR EVOLUTION OF MABE CORPORATE CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP MANAGEMENT FOCUS
1988-90 n Appliance business of Grupo Industrial Saltillo (GIS)
acquired - mainly washing machines; MABE thereby
attains 50% appliance market share.
n Joint venture "Leiser" plant for U.S. gas range exports
starts up in San Luis Potosi.
n Fourth moment of truth: challenge of joint team with GE to
design and build new 100M new plant.
n Fifth moment of truth: cultural integration of acquired companies.
n Focus on international competitiveness.
n Modernization of Mexico City plant.
1991 Modernization and expansion of refrigerator production
begins.
Continuous improvement strategy introduced. Focus on after-sale service: technically based, nation-wide
service introduced.
1992-93 n MABE adds a new 400,000-unit line to its Querearo
refrigerator plant.
n Technology Center in Queretaro opens.
n Acquisition of Ceteco in Venezuela and Polarix in
Colombia.
n Sixth moment of truth: Transnational expansion into South
America.
Change from production focus to market focus:
systematic reorganization of brands, sales channels,
logistics, prices.
1994 Alliance with SANYO in compressors: 65% MABE, 35%
SANYO.
Focus on marketing: market analysis, brand positio ing,
advertising media plan.
1995 n Following 50% drop in exchange rate of peso, MABE at
GE suggestion holds supplier and parts fair in Mexico City,
initiating broad substitution of imported components by
domestically supplied components in all lines.
n Distribution in Guatemala & Costa Rica begins; acquisition
of Durex in Ecuador; purchase of "Centrales" brand in
Colombia.
n New 1,800,000-unit joint venture (SANYO) compressor
plant begins operations.
n Seventh moment of truth: Holding course through Mexico's
national economic crisis.
n Focus on sales: horizontal specialization of sales
channels; training in sales techniques.
n Focus on the logistics of distribution: plant flexibility to
produce what is sold; logistics information system; 8
distribution centers.
1996 n Compact washing machine production transferred to
Monterrey; new automatic washing machine plant in
Saltillo starts up.
n MABE PERU begins operations.
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i. "Core competency" is used in this study to denote the concept introduced into the business
literature by Prahalad and Hamel, as discussed in detail below (see the Conceptual Framework
section).  Though "competence" is a legitimate variant both in pronunciation and spelling, it is
convenient to select one variant, "competency" (pl. "competencies"), for specifically technical usage
in Prahalad and Hamel's sense and to leave the other variant, "competence," for usage in the
general non-technical sense.
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C1, C12.
v. The World Bank (1995) has estimated national wealth as the sum of (1) natural wealth in land
(crops, etc); (2) other natural wealth (minerals, water); (3) produced or manufactured wealth; and
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text, the Western industrially advanced economies are consistently in the high band.  Economies
with lower levels of industrialization may or may not be in the same high band; Mexico registers 87
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1.
vi. Peter Morici (1993), "Grasping the Benefits of NAFTA," Current History, Vol. 92. No 571, Feb., p.52.
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Iberoamerica, 1991.
viii. Kras (1991), Prólogo (Foreword), by José de la Cerda Gastélum.  (Author's translation.)
ix. The features of an advanced interational management style will, by contrast, be summarized in the
Conceptual Framework section, below.
x. U.S.-Mexican cultural differences in management styles are also presented in considerable detail in
Anthony de Palma (1994), "It Takes More than a Visa to Do Business in Mexico," New York Times,
Sunday, June 26, Sec. 3, p.5.
xi. Kras (1991), Ch. 7, 91-121.
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Hampden-Turner and Alfons Trompenaars (1993), The Seven Cultures of Capitalism, New York,
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(1994).
xiv. Institute for International Human Resources, personal communication.  It is of course important to
recognize that in Japan, key financial decisions are often determined at the supra-corporate level,
that is, at the level of the banking institution that functions as the core of the  keiretsu to which the
corporation belongs.  It is none the less noteworthy that Japan's form of business organiz tion has
often serendipitously permitted the human resource function to become part of the top corporate
strategic level, with all the competitive advantage that this implies in a globalizing information
economy.
xv. World Bank (1995).
xvi. "Devolution of power" is used to replace "empowerment."
xvii. Michael Porter (1979), "How Competitive Forces Shape Strategy," Harvard Business Review,
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xxiii. Hamel and Prahalad (1989), p.75.
xxiv. This conception is present in one form or another in S nge (1990), Hamel and Prahalad (1989),
and Block (1993).
xxv. See Peter Block (1993), Stewardship: Choosing Srvice over Self-Interest, San Francisco, Barrett-
Koehler Publishers.
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York, Doubleday Books.
xxvii. See Harvard Business Review (1993) and Stewart (1991).
xxviii. From GE Annual Report, 1990, cited in Harvard Business School (1993), p.14.  See also Note 39.
xxix. Though from the U.S. perspective this arena might not seem that different, ind ed, Mexico and
South America might look almost interchangeable, from a Latin perspective such a perception
would be dismissed as a U.S. blind spot.
xxx. Harvard Business School (1985), pp. 3-5.
xxxi. Urbano Perez interview; also IPADE (1992) (Instituto Panamericano de Alta Dirección de Empresas
- Panamerican Institute of Higher Management), Organización MABE: Planta Leiser (San Luis Po-
tosí) (MABE Organization, "Leiser" Plant -  San Luis Potosi), Mexico, p.3.
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xxxiii. The ratio of minimum wages in the U.S. and Mexico was about 5:1; bt since actual wages in the
respective industries in the U.S. tended to be well above the minimum wage while in Mexico they
did not, the ratio of actual wages was closer to 10:1.
xxxiv. IPADE (1992), p.4.
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and faults, being too slow, and having an insufficiently aggressive sales approach.  Vitro, in turn,
complained about Corning's being too direct and too fast; it was particularly bitter about Corning's
detailed public discussion of the causes of failure of the joint venture.
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Business School (1993), p.10.  Other tools of culture change were Best Practices and Process
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